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ARTICLE
FEDERAL COURT CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF STATE LAW TO STATE COURTS: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
Rebecca A. Cochran*
"[T]he judge who is here sitting is thoroughly persuaded by his thirty-one
years of trial and appellate practice in the Alabama courts as a private practitioner
and by his six (plus) years offederal judicial experience sitting in the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama that he can reasonably predict the opinion and holding of Ala-
bama 's highest court .... ,i
I. INTRODUCTION
State and federal judges must be ambidextrous: state judges are
obliged to interpret and apply both federal and state law2 and federal judges
are similarly obliged to interpret and apply state and federal law. 3  State
court judges adjudicate federal law cases under the principles of parity and
predict unsolved federal law when the United States Supreme Court has not
spoken on a federal question.4 When faced with a question of state law not
yet resolved by the state's highest court, a federal judge decides the issue by
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Colorado College 1974. M.A., North-
western University, 1975; J.D., The John Marshall Law School 1984. I thank my colleagues and friends who
offered critique and support: Derrick Bolen, Colleen Cross, Maria Crist, Kelvin Dickinson, Charlie Hallinan,
Bradford Hughes, Jeffrey Morris, Rick Perna, and Susan Wawrose. I also thank my e-mail mentor, Michael
Solimine.
1. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1195 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
2. The Supremacy Clause creates this obligation. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state
courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the
laws of the United States.").
3. The Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)), and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938), create the federal courts'
obligation to apply state law.
4. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1999). This ability of state courts to
hear and decide federal law cases is part of the notion of "parity."); see also MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES
L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS 29 (Greenwood Press 1999) (Broadly defined, parity is the "avail-
ability and qualitative receptivity of state courts to adjudicate and . uphold federal rights.") [hereinafter
"RESPECTING STATE COURTS"].
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predicting how that court would resolve the issue. 5
Each court system's ability to interpret and apply the other's law has
been questioned. Beginning in the 1970's and continuing today, some
judges and legal scholars have debated the strength of parity, which is, a
state court's availability and ability to interpret federal law.6 Despite argu-
ments for federal court superiority in resolving important federal law issues,
state court jurisdiction remains unchanged, requiring state court judges to
interpret both federal law and state law.
All federal court judges would appear to face the same dual tasks as
state court judges because they, too, must receive and resolve issues of both
state law and federal law. 7 Thus, a notion of "reverse parity" exists: the fed-
eral courts are deemed available to receive and adjudicate state law.8 Fed-
eral court competence to decide state law issues was presumed when Erie
required the federal courts to interpret and apply state law.
9
Yet federal courts have an advantage over their state counterparts.
They have some ability to control the issues of state law that they must re-
solve. Federal courts use exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction,10 and in
rare cases, Pullman abstention, 1 to return cases to state court. Further, to
5. See, e.g., Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Commissioner v.
Bosch's Estate, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (explaining that a federal court determines state law by giving
"'proper regard' to lower state court holdings)).
6. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Burt Neuborne, Parity
Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 797 (1995); Michael Wells, Be-
hind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 609 (1991); contra RESPECTING STATE COURTS, supra note 4, at 29-62 (arguing that a study of state
courts' ability to interpret federally guaranteed rights concludes "relative parity" exists between state and
federal courts abilities to interpret such rights).
7. State law issues enter the federal system through diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In addition, federal statutes may require federal courts to
refer to the state law as the rule of decision, see Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975). See also
Colloquium, Perspectives on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 1 (1992); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al.,
Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40
EMORY L.J. 943 (1991).
8. The author is indebted to Professor Michael Solimine who used this term in a discussion of these
issues.
9. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
10. Federal courts may rely on the four enumerated exceptions to such jurisdiction to decline to decide the
state law claim. The parties are left to pursue the state law claims in the state system, beginning at the trial
level. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (district court "shall" exercise jurisdiction, except it may decline if claim raises "novel
or complex issue of State law," the State law claim dominates over original jurisdiction claim, the original
jurisdiction claim has been dismissed, or there are "compelling" reasons for declining jurisdiction). District
court judges exercise discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction; such decisions are frequently made, but
rarely disturbed. See, e.g., Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp. Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993) ("This
court will review only for an abuse of discretion .... "); Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that discretion to relinquish jurisdiction over state law claims when federal claims have been
resolved is "'almost unreviewable"').
11. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (explaining that where controlling state
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avoid the often difficult and time-consuming process of researching and pre-
dicting the outcome of unresolved state law questions, federal court judges
may certify the state law question over to the state's highest court. 12 Today,
in forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, some or all
federal judges can certify a question to the state's highest court, asking that
court to answer the question.13 The process of state law certification under-
cuts the principle of "reverse parity" because the state law question is sent to
those more expert in state law-the state court judges. Certification advo-
cates presume that state court judges, for several reasons, will be better
equipped than federal judges to determine and interpret state law. 14
law is uncertain, federal court may retain jurisdiction while parties seek a decision on state law issues in state
court).
12. In 1945, Florida became the first state to create a statute or court rule permitting the highest court of a
state to accept certified questions from federal courts. See 1945 FLA. LAWS, ch. 23098, § 1 (now codified as
Fla. Stat. ch. 25.031 (1998)).
13. See ALA. R. APP. P. 18; ALASKA R. APP. P. 407; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861 (West 1994);
ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 27; CAL. R. CT. 29.8; COLO. APP. R. 21.1; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199b (West
2002); CONN. R. APP. P. §§ 82-1 to -7; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(9); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41; D.C. CODE ANN. §
11-723 (1981 & 1987 Supp.); D.C. CT. APP. R. 54; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (6); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031
(West 1997); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-9 (1999); GA. SUP. CT. R. 46; HAW. R. APP. P.
13; IDAHO APP. R. 12.2; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 20; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2-4-1 (Michie 1998); IND. APP. R. 64,
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/appellate/; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 684.A.l-A.11 (West 1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201 to -3212 (1994); KY. R. CIV. P. 76.37; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West
1999); LA. SUP. CT. R. XII; ME. R. APP. P. 25; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -609
(1998); MASS. SUP. JUD. Ct. R. 1:03; MICH. CT. R. 7.305; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.065 (West Supp. 2000);
MISS. R. APP. P. 20; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West Supp. 2000) (held unconstitutional by Grantham v.
Mo. Dept. of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159 (Mo. 1990); MONT. R. APP. P. 44; NEB. REV. Stat. §§ 24-
219 to -225 (1997); NEV. R. APP. P. 5 available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/NRAP.html; N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 34; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-7-1 to 7-13 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); N.M. R. APP. P. 12-607;
N.Y. CT. R. § 500.17; N.D. R. APP. P. 47 available at
http://www.court.state.nd.us/Rules/appellattframeset.htm; R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, §§ 1601-11 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.200-.255 (1997); OR. R. APP. P. 12.20 available at
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/Web/OJDPublications.nsf/ORAPOpenView&count-1000; P.R. SUP. CT. R. 27; In
re Certification of Questions of Law, No. 197 Judicial Admin. Docket No. I (Penn. Super. Ct. 2000) (adopting
certification after using it on one-year trial basis) available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2
/pennsylvaniastatecases/supreme/197-rul.pdf; RI. SUP. CT. RULES, art. I, R. 6; S.C. APP. CT. R. 228; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-24A-1 to 15-24A-1 I (Michie 1994); S.D. S. CT. R. 85-7; TENN. R. SUP. CT. 23; TEX.
R. APP. P. 214 (used for certification to Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); TEX. R. APP. P. 114 (used for
certification to Texas Supreme Court); UTAH R. APP. P. 41; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42; VT. R. AP. P. 14 (ex-
tended until Dec. 12, 2003 by Vt. Supreme Court Order No. 02-02); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.60.010 to
2.60.900 (West 1998); WASH. R. APP. P. 16.16; W. VA. CODE §§ 51-lA-1 to -13 (1994); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§
821.01 to.12 (West 1994); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-106 (Michie 1994); WYo. R. APP. P. 11.01-07.
Currently, Arkansas, New Jersey, and North Carolina have no state law certification procedures.
14. See, e.g., William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurispru-
dential Reasons Why New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 519
(1998) (("it is perverse for federal judges, who, at least in the case of circuit judges, may neither be residents
or nor attorneys admitted to practice in New Jersey, to determine important areas of New Jersey policy."); see
also Michaels v. New Jersey, 150 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he interpretation of state statutes govern-
ing the allocation of certain financial responsibilities between the State and one of its subdivisions-is [a
question] that seems to us particularly inappropriate for resolution by a federal court ... [but] we have no
choice but to 'predict' how the state supreme court would decide the question before us .. "). The exceptions
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The state court, at its discretion, may accept or decline the certifica-
tion, but cannot ignore it. 5 To decide to accept or deny certification may
require a separate round of briefing. 16  Then the state court may reach the
merits of the certified question and schedule the next round of merit brief-
ing.' 7  By certifying state law questions federal courts may seek to reduce
their workload and avoid the time-consuming process of deciding or predict-
ing difficult questions of state law. No state court at any level, however,
enjoys the opportunity to certify difficult questions of federal law to a fed-
eral court.'
8
This Article argues that certification, once a response to early, stum-
bling federal court efforts to predict state law after Erie and viewed as an
attractive, efficient alternative to Pullman abstention, has been widely em-
braced, praised and justified without regard to certification as it has been
practiced and how that practice affects benefits to both court systems that
to federal court supplemental jurisdiction also suggest federal judges are less competent in state law issues.
See Huff nan, supra note 10, (finding that it is proper to relinquish state law claims to state court because of
"the state court's greater expertise in applying state law ...."); see Patrick D. Murphy, A Federal Practitio-
ner's Guide to Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 973, 1022 (1995)
("[E]xceptions appear to be premised on a belief that state courts are more competent in interpreting state law
than are federal courts."); Huffman v. Haines, 865 F.2d at 923 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding it proper to relinquish
state law claims to state court because of "the state court's greater expertise in applying state law.").
15. One commentator would remove this discretion, arguing that Congress, using its powers under Art.
IV, Section 1, should "enact a federal statute imposing on state supreme courts an obligation to decide unclear
issues of state law certified by federal courts, trial and appellate, for resolution." L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a
Parallel Universe: Erie's Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction, Georgia Conflict of Law Questions in Contract
Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and Certification Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (1995).
16. See, e.g., R. PRAC. SUP CT. OHIO XVIII § 6, which requires that after certification order is filed,
"each party shall file a memorandum, not to exceed fifteen pages in length, addressing all questions of law
certified... " The Ohio Supreme Court reviews the memoranda and issues "an entry identifying the question
or questions it will answer and declining to answer the remaining question or questions." Id. This decision to
accept the question(s) may produce dissents.
17. If the certified question(s) is accepted, then the parties submit merit briefs. See id. at (7). The peti-
tioner shall file a merit brief not exceeding fifty pages; the respondent shall file an answer brief not exceeding
fifty pages. The petitioner may file a reply brief not exceeding fifteen pages. See id. at (6). Parties may seek
oral arguments; amicus parties may seek to file briefs as in other Ohio Supreme Court proceedings.
18. This lack of reciprocity, therefore, cannot be an explicit factor in deciding to accept or reject a certi-
fied question from a federal court. The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, however, provides
that a court receiving a certified question from another state court "may consider, among other factors,
whether the [certifying court].., has authority to answer a certified question from the [receiving court] . "
UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3 (amended 1995) cmt., 12 U.L.A. (1996). Judge New-
man, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, once proposed reciprocal routing of appeals
between the federal and state systems, but in an effort to ease federal court caseloads. See Jon 0. Newman,
Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
761, 774-75 (1989). Whether the lack of reciprocity is an unexpressed consideration to state supreme court
justices cannot be precisely known. The surveys of judicial attitudes toward certification might give some
clues. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 35-38
(Am. Jud. Soc'y 1995) (providing examples of state court judges declining certified questions when federal
court has already resolved them).
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could flow in the absence of certification.1 9 For example, the certification
process sidesteps final decisions required by the appellate process and per-
mits a trial court in one system to certify a question to the highest court in
another system. Yet certification advocates often express little concern for
the process's conflict with these policies and its unusual procedural charac-
teristics. Further, certification advocates assert that federal courts are less
capable of interpreting state law than state courts. In contrast, some long-
standing views of federal courts have deemed them generally superior to
state courts, even in matters of state law. Advocates for certification pre-
sume that when a federal court predicts state law, it engages in a dangerous,
speculative, potentially embarrassing and intolerable practice that it is poorly
equipped to perform. The potential for inconsistency between federal pre-
dictions and state court decisions is deemed unacceptable and viewed as in-
viting forum shopping. Finally, certification advocates assert the process
promotes judicial economy and efficiency.
The Article next examines the certification process in Ohio as a case
study of the strengths and weaknesses of the process. The Article concludes,
after detailed analysis of Ohio's certification experiences, that federal certi-
fying courts and the Ohio Supreme Court have largely accepted certification
as a process to be encouraged and embraced with little analysis of its actual
practice. Federal and state courts both need to apply Ohio's certification
rule more explicitly and carefully. A rule that contradicts the appellate re-
view process should be used more carefully and applied more explicitly.
Ohio and other jurisdictions have presumed that only benefits can flow from
the process; yet, in practice, certification in Ohio has resulted in advisory
opinions, permitted a range of forum shopping, encouraged efforts to avoid
the appellate process, and produced opinions so devoid of analysis that for
years afterward, courts work to fill in the potholes of missing doctrine. Fur-
ther, Ohio federal courts and the Ohio Supreme Court tend not to rely on the
experiences of other jurisdictions employing certification procedures.
The Article examines closely the procedural history, substance, and
19. Yet certification has not been without its critics. See, e.g., How a Federal Court Determines State
Law, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1299 (1946) (arguing that federal court function is to predict what the highest state
court would do and such prediction is an accepted function of "every court in an appellate hierarchy); Brian
Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 717, 731 (1969) (describing "the case against certification"); David P. Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute: Part IA 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (arguing that to promote
judicial economy, federal courts should answer state law questions); Larry M. Roth, Certified Questions from
the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (Florida Supreme Court
caseload has "produced lengthy time delays in the certification process.").
2003]
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resolution of the fifty-five certified question cases sent to the Ohio Supreme
Court from federal courts from the start of Ohio certification on July 15,
1988, to the close of calendar year 2001. Next, the Article turns from the
specifics of Ohio's federal and state court certification cases to test the un-
derlying policies supporting certification: (1) the dangers of prediction as a
method of decision making; (2) the inability of federal judges to predict the
views of the Ohio Supreme Court; and (3) the presumed efficiency of certifi-
cation over Pullman abstention. The Article concludes that Ohio state and
federal courts need to adopt new certification practices to enhance the bene-
fits of the certification process and to minimize accompanying harm.
II. BACKGROUND
The unilateral certification of state law questions to state courts from
federal courts began, in part, in response to federal court decisions issued
after Erie. The certification process, first put into action by the United
States Supreme Court, has gained nearly universal support and acceptance as
an attractive alternative either to prediction under Erie or to abstention under
Pullman.2 °
A. Erie's Federal Prediction of State Law
Federal diversity jurisdiction requires federal courts to decide issues
of state law.2' In 1938, the United States Supreme Court required federal
courts to learn and interpret state law because a federal court sitting in diver-
sity applies state law because there is "no federal common law. ' '22 The Erie
Court sought to discourage forum shopping and to avoid "inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws. 23 Thus, when facing an unsettled or unclear prece-
dent on an important issue of state law, the federal court must review the law
available and predict how the highest court in the state would most likely
rule, rather than develop a federal common law rule which might differ from
24the state law rule and encourage forum shopping.
20. See generally Bassler, supra note 14, at 497-98 ("[The certification process] ... and its endorsement
by significant American legal institutions, has spawned a vast amount of literature ... [that] has been favor-
able, for the most part, to the use ofinterjurisdictional certification.").
21. Although the wisdom of diversity jurisdiction has been hotly debated, it remains with us. 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (2000). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 n.20 (citing 1930's articles and sources arguing that diversity jurisdic-
tion be eliminated or limited). See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction & Related Matters §§ 3601-3610 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 2002).
22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
23. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). See also Brown, Fifth Circuit Certification-Federalism
in Action, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455,468 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Clark v. Modem Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993) ("When the application of
[Vol. 29:2
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The Erie Court, and others after it, endorsed "reverse parity" because
they viewed federal judges as perfectly capable of deciding state law ques-
tions and called upon them to do so. "[Diversity cases are decided in district
courts] manned by judges from the local Bars and fairly conversant with the
laws of their respective areas. They are equipped to decide questions of lo-
cal law as well as federal questions. 25
In the early years after Erie, federal court judges inevitably faced un-
settled state law issues and were forced to develop methods for prediction.
Although no single, definitive answer appears to explain why state legisla-
tures and courts moved toward the certification process, the struggle federal
courts initially experienced in reaching a settled method for prediction may
have worried state legislators and state judges, while simultaneously frustrat-
ing federal judges. The Erie Court itself simply instructed federal courts to
use the state's substantive law as "declared by its legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision.,
26
But, when the highest state court had not issued a decision on point,
Erie offered no advice. In the years after Erie, however, the gap between
state law in federal and state courts grew wider as federal courts mechani-
cally adhered to state lower court decisions, no matter how old or poorly
reasoned.27 Thus, federal courts sometimes ended up obediently following
as binding, lower state court decisions that would not have been similarly
honored by state courts.28 Observers feared that federal courts' fierce loyalty
to lower state court decisions, in the absence of a ruling from the highest
state court, revived "the precise evil of forum-shopping" and undermined the
uniformity of law the Erie Court sought to establish.29
In post-Erie efforts to sort out the federal courts' role in determining
state law, some federal courts began to articulate a more reasoned process of
(state] law is not clear, we must forecast the position the supreme court of the forum would take on the
issue."). See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judi-
cial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495 (1997) ("[M]ost federal courts today employ a
predictive approach-that is, they attempt to forecast how the state's highest court would decide the question
were the case before it."); see WRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 4507
25. Clay v. Sun. Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. 304 U.S. at 78.
27. See, e.g., Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464,468-69 (1940) (reversing lower federal court that
failed to follow Missouri law stated in state Court of Appeals decisions, but where no Missouri Supreme Court
decision addressed the issue).
28. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 291, 294 (1946) (suggesting that the federal courts' blind adherence to a lower state
court decision might motivate a litigant to file in federal court to avoid the state court forum where a state
judge might re-examine, re-consider or not follow non-binding decisions of other state courts).
29. Note, How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1946).
2003]
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prediction. In the absence of a decision from the state's highest court, a fed-
eral court could predict a state appellate decision on the issue or predict the
decision of "reasonable, intelligent lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest
[state] court and fully conversant with [state] jurisprudence."3 ° The federal
courts slowly reasoned their way to a more uniform, predictive approach to
questions of state law not yet resolved by the highest state court.
But based on the federal courts' initial struggles and frustrations, 3'
some state legislatures and Supreme Court justices, seeing federal courts
falter in predicting state law, began to take matters into their own hands.
Seven years after Eri e, in 1945, a state legislature created a means to avoid
federal court prediction by certifying an unresolved issue of state law to the
Florida Supreme Court for resolution. 32 The statute authorized the Florida
Supreme Court to adopt rules for accepting certified questions from federal
courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court. Thus, the Florida
legislature, not the Florida Supreme Court, decided certification was a good
idea.
What specifically motivated the Florida legislature in 1945 may
never be known precisely. 33 One likely source of motivation was the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Meredith v. Winter Haven in 1943. 34
Following Pullman in 1941, the Meredith decision warned federal judges
against misusing the abstention doctrine as a means to avoid deciding diffi-
cult, unsettled questions of state law. 35 The Fifth Circuit had found Florida
state law difficult and uncertain; therefore, "since no federal question was
presented and the jurisdiction was invoked purely on grounds of diversity of
citizenship, it thought petitioners should be required to proceed to the state
courts., 36 Not only was the law uncertain, the Fifth Court found that for it to
settle such state law "would be undertaking to declare the public policy of a
30. Cooper v. American Airlines, 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945) (determining capacity to sue or be
sued according to state law; district court followed an intermediate appellate state court, but Second Circuit
reversed, finding that intermediate appellate state court decision should have been disregarded because highest
state court twice stated the issue was undecided).
31. Id. (noting Court was tempted to direct district court to withhold decision until state court decided it
authoritatively, but reluctantly concluding the Supreme Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943), "instructs us to yield to no such temptation" and finds "this case is in that zone in which federal courts
must do their best to guess what the highest state court will do.").
32. Fla. Stat. Ch. 25.031 (1995).
33. See Roth, supra note 19, at 6 n.28 ("There are no known recorded reports or hearings with regard to
the legislative history of Fla. Stat. § 25.031 (1977).").
34. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
35. Id. at 234-35.
36. Id. at 231.
[Vol. 29:2
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state in respect to obligations of its municipalities . . . . , A dissenter ar-
gued the Fifth Circuit should address, not dismiss, the claim and decide it as
the Florida Supreme Court would.38
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, finding no exceptional
circumstances warranting abstention, only the difficulty of deciding unset-
tled questions of state law.39 Ordered to decide the issue, the Fifth Circuit
then gave the claim new life and returned it back to the federal district
court.4 0 The Florida legislature witnessed the Fifth Circuit's expressed in-
ability to decide unsettled, important state matters.4' And it also saw that
professed incompetence or not, the United States Supreme Court required the
Fifth Circuit to decide the case rather than send it to the Florida state courts.
Seeing the Fifth Circuit forced to determine unsettled Florida state law in its
March 1944 decision, may have moved the Florida legislature to take matters
into their own hands.
Whatever motivated the Florida legislature's desire for certification
in 1945, the Florida Supreme Court did not accept the legislature's invitation
to create a certification rule for fifteen years. And even then, the Florida
Supreme Court acted only after the United States Supreme Court got into the
act. In 1960, the Court suggested to the Fifth Circuit that it could use the
state certification process to resolve an issue of Florida law, but simultane-
ously recognized that the Florida Supreme Court had never enacted any rules
for certification even though the Florida statute had given them the go-ahead
fifteen years earlier.42 Thus, the first use of a state's certification procedure
came about because the highest federal court in the nation urged a federal
appellate court to respect state law on remand and send a certified question
to the state supreme court, a court that had declined to enact a certification
rule.
The Clay Court saw an additional benefit in the certification statute
beyond a state's desire to rein in federal courts in the wake of Erie's uncer-
tainty and undefined methods of state law prediction. The Court found the
Fifth Circuit's decision to reach a constitutional due process issue first,
37. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1943).
38, Id. at 208 (Sibley, J., dissenting).
39. 320 U.S. at 237.
40. Meredith, 141 F.2d at 352.
41. In Meredith, the Supreme Court talked about how the Fifth Circuit openly "expressed doubt as to what
the Florida law applicable to the facts ... now is or will be declared to be, and in view of this uncertainty"
directed the petitioners "to proceed in the state courts." 320 U.S. at 23 1.
42. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 212 n.3 ("it appears that to date such rules have not been prom-
ulgated.").
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rather than address the Florida state statute, troubling.43 Although Clay did
not fall within the Pullman abstention doctrine, the certification process pro-
vided a similar ability to avoid deciding a federal constitutional issue.
44
Thus, the certification process was praised for its dual benefits. It would
allow the state courts to support federal courts during their post-Erie struggle
with state law, and it would allow federal courts to avoid deciding issues that
did not technically require abstention, but where a definitive state ruling
would help. Further, where abstention was required, the certification alter-
native would result in less delay and expense.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently championed the
cause of state law question certification. The Court uses the process itself
and recommends it to the lower federal courts. 45 The Court encourages certi-
fication, noting that certification's threshold, unlike that of abstention, is
low-an unsettled state law question, not an exceptional circumstance.46
Further, to decline to certify when a state supreme court will receive certi-
fied questions and instead to speculate about state law questions is "particu-
larly egregious.,
47
43. Clay, 363 U.S. at 211-12.
44. The ability to avoid the delay of Pullman abstention is, indeed, a traditional argument advanced in
favor of certification. See, e.g., Theodore B. Eichelberger, Note, Certification Statutes. Engineering a Solu-
tion to Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339 (1984); Comment, Certifying Questions to
State Supreme Courts as a Remedy to the Abstention Doctrine, 9 S.D. L. REV. 158 (1964); Comment, Certifi-
cation to state Courts: Progress in the Field of Federal Abstention, 36 TUL. L. REV. 571 (1962). See gener-
ally WRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 4248 (placing state law certification discussion within chapter discussing
abstention doctrines).
45. See, e.g., Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999) (asking ifa Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion applied
retroactively; certified question came one month before Pennsylvania's temporary certification statute would
expire unless renewed); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1988) (asking Virginia
Supreme Court two questions about state statute regulating sexually explicit materials where viewed by juve-
niles); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1982) (asking Georgia Supreme Court: "What are the premises
of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?"); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-53
(1976) (holding district court should have certified questions concerning parental consent to abortion state
statute to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, vacating three judge district court judgment and re-
manding). But see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (declining to ask Nebraska Supreme Court about
partial birth abortion statute where lower federal courts did not seek to certify and state court accepts certifica-
tion only if answer to question would be determinative of the case).
46. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) (criticizing lower federal
courts for refusal to certify, although holding case moot, and noting certification requires not "unique circum-
stances," only "unsettled questions of state law.").
47. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 (1985) (recommending certification and deem-
ing federal court "speculation," where a state court will answer certified questions, as "particularly gratui-
tous") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. Universal Praise for and Use of State Law Question Certification
Momentum for certification increased significantly with the first
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act ("UCQLA") in 1967, fol-
lowed by the revised 1995 Act.48 The 1995 UCQLA provides for acceptance
of certified questions from nearly every existing court:
The [Supreme Court] of this state may answer a question of law
certified to it by a court of the United States or by [an appel-
late][the highest] court of another State [or of a tribe][or of Can-
ada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state],
if the answer may be determinative of an issue pending in the liti-
gation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate
decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.49
The Comments clarify that "a court of the United States" includes all
federal courts, including Bankruptcy courts. 50 This language, new in the
1995 Act, increased the number of courts with the power to certify. 5' The
provision reflects the drafters' belief that, although the number of courts able
to certify has expanded, the receiving court retains control over its dockets
through its power to accept or reject the questions.
The Uniform Act provides the broadest scope of certifying courts. In
practice, the range of courts permitted to certify varies greatly from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. 52 Eighteen states accept certified questions from all fed-
eral courts; all state intermediate appellate or highest courts; and sometimes
tribal, Canadian, and Mexican courts. 53 Eighteen states chose to omit all
state courts and accept questions from federal courts only. 54  The largest
states, California, Illinois, and New York, and eight other states, including
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas, chose the narrowest scope for certifi-
cation. 55 These narrow jurisdictions typically deny not only all state courts,
but federal district courts the power to certify, limiting the scope of the certi-
fication provision to a single federal court of appeals or all federal courts of
48. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967), 12 U.L.A. 86 (1996) (revised by the Unif. Certifi-
cation of Questions of Law (Act) (Rule) 1995,12 U.L.A. 71 (1996).
49. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law (Act) (Rule) 1995 § 3, 12 U.L.A. 74 (1996).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. This range is depicted in Appendix A.
53. Id., left column.




appeals and the United States Supreme Court.56
The current Act now explicitly authorizes the receiving court to "re-
formulate a question of law certified to it," in hopes that this flexibility will
avoid an advisory opinion. 57 To further promote cooperation and communi-
cation, the receiving court is to notify the certifying court when it has re-
jected or accepted the certified question. 58 The receiving court "in accor-
dance with notions of comity and fairness . . . [should] respond to an ac-
cepted certified question as soon as practicable." 59 Should the receiving
court decline to answer a question, it may "advise the certifying court of the
reasons for a rejection.160
III. DISCUSSION
Judging by the states' widespread embrace of certification, its advo-
cates have successfully argued its advantages. Certification places state law
issues before state court judges with greater competence in state law; there-
fore, these judges will render "better" decisions than federal judges.61 When
state courts decide these issues, that process avoids the dual dangers of fed-
eral court speculation and federal court imposition of uniquely federal per-
62
spectives that lead to misinterpretation of state law issues. Having state
judges act as the state law decision-makers promotes federalism because it
serves to allocate and share judicial power between the state and federal
court systems.63 The certification process promotes judicial efficiency,
56. The district courts are the main source of referrals in Ohio. Of fifty-five certification cases, all but ten
came from district courts. See Appendix D. By omitting district courts, these narrow jurisdictions seek limita-
tions beyond the Uniform Act's broader scope.
57. MoNT. R. APP. P. 44.; Kincaid v. Magum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 83 (W.Va. 1993) (stating that a court retains
flexibility and discretion to re-frame or reshape certified questions). Contra Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
787 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1990) (observing that the certified question process "is a very limited procedural
device: we answer only the questions certified and nothing more.").
58. MONT. R. APP. P. 7.
59. Id.
60. Id. But see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress 's Power to Direct
State Judicial Action: Congress 's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law,
31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650 (1999) (analyzing if Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to compel
state courts to answer certified questions of state law and concluding that the power may exist, but that "sound
reasons counsel against its exercise.").
61. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 291, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting)
("States like New Jersey lacking certification procedures face the threat that federal courts will misanalyze the
state's law, already open to varied interpretations, by inadvertently viewing it through the lens of their own
federal jurisprudential assumptions.").
62. See, e.g., Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1969) ("Where there are no govern-
ing state decisions, then the federal court must rule the issues as it is believed the highest state court would
rule. Admittedly, this is a hazardous and unsatisfactory method of deciding litigation.").
63. See generally John R. Brown, Certification -Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455 (1977).
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avoiding the delays of Pullman abstention. 64
While judicial economy, respect for state courts, state court expertise
to decide state law issues, and the dangers of federal courts predicting state
law appear to support certification, these benefits are more frequently pre-
sumed to exist than demonstrated from certification practice. Examining
Ohio's certification practices through the individual Ohio cases moving
through these procedures provides a better opportunity to measure the bene-
fits and detriments certification brings to both court systems. The Ohio Su-
preme Court's practices are examined first, followed by federal court prac-
tices. Finally, Ohio certification practice becomes the evidence used to test
the assumed benefits of state court expertise in state law and judicial effi-
ciency, as well as the presumed dangers of federal prediction of state law.
A. Ohio Supreme Court Certification:
A Case Study of Certification Practices
To test the articulated policies and intended benefits of certification
against the practice of state law certification,65 questions certified to and
addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court, a court adopting certification with a
moderate scope, 66 are examined from the start of Ohio certification on July
1, 1988, through December 31, 2001. The study includes fifty-five cases:
cases where certification was declined, where certification was accepted, or
where the Court dismissed the case. 67 To judge the context of the certifica-
64. See generally Theodore B. Eichelberger, Note, Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to
Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339 (1984).
65. The American Judicature Society undertook an extensive survey of federal and state court judges to
measure their enthusiasm for the state-federal certification process. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 58-74
(surveying federal and state judges on their recent experiences with and opinions regarding certification); See
also Jon B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice ofLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411,
447 (1988) (surveying federal and state judges on experiences with certification, including case-specific ques-
tions and broader attitudes and concluding that "problems associated with certification probably have been
overstated."). Other studies, focusing on certification in New York state, have supplied more state-specific
detail. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions
in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 397-422 (2000) (analyzing the cases certified to New York Court of
Appeals from federal circuit courts of appeals); Jack J. Rose, Note, Erie R.R. and State Power to Control State
Law: Switching Tracks to New Certification of Questions of Law Procedure, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421 (1989)
(reviewing the New York rule and examining two certification cases in detail). The New York studies are
useful, but examining New York's narrow certification rule, one which excludes federal district courts. See
Appendix A.
66. R. PRAc. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII § I provides "The Supreme Court may answer a question of law
certified to it by "a court of the United States." This rule may be invoked when the certifying court, in a pro-
ceeding before it, determines there is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding and
for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Supreme Court, and issues a certification
order."
67. See Appendix C.
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tion cases within the Ohio and federal court systems, the study also considers
cases reaching the Ohio Supreme Court from Ohio appellate court decisions
certified based on conflicts, 8 where Pullman abstention occurred, and where
an Ohio federal court chose to predict unsettled Ohio law.
To summarize briefly these results: of the fifty-five questions ad-
dressed by the Ohio Supreme Court, it resolved nine by dismissal, declined
to answer ten, and issued an order or opinion in answer to thirty-six. Four-
teen Ohio district court judges, three non-Ohio district court judges and ten
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panels sent certified questions. The law of
torts, in the form of products liability, dominated the questions asked. In
additional tort cases, several wrongful death cases raised questions of under-
insured and uninsured motorist insurance. The average time from certifica-
tion to resolution was 11.96 months, with five weeks being the shortest wait
and twenty-five months the longest wait.
1. Ohio Supreme Court Certification: Unique Access to the Ohio Supreme
Court
The Ohio study begins with the nature and scope of the certification
process. The rule permits the Ohio Supreme Court to answer questions certi-
fied to it from all federal district court judges and magistrates in the nation,
all the federal circuit courts of appeals and the United States Supreme
Court.69 When the Ohio Supreme Court promulgated the Rule in 1988, Ohio
federal courts had already expressed interest in having certification available
in Ohio.70 The process, by definition, is not an appeal because the Rule re-
quires that the certifying court, whether trial or appellate, has not resolved a
legal issue that "is determinative of the outcome of the case," and "for which
there is no controlling precedent" from the Ohio Supreme Court.71
Judged by certification and appellate practices in the Ohio and fed-
68. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO IV(I) permits an Ohio court of appeals to issue an order certifying a conflict
between court of appeals' decisions on an issue. The Ohio Supreme Court, at its discretion, may certify the
conflict and order briefing, find no conflict and dismiss, or order the court of appeals to clarify the issue. See
Appendix C.
69. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII.
70. See, e.g., In re Aircrash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, on March 9, 1967, 350 F. Supp. 757, 768 n.1
(S.D. Ohio 1972) (noting the Delaware certification process and observing that
[t]he adoption of a procedure for the certification of questions of Ohio law to the Su-
preme Court of Ohio from the United States District Courts for the Northern and South-
ern Districts of Ohio and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would
seem to be a useful step toward eliminating uncertainty as to the requirements of Ohio
law in diversity cases.
71. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII.
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eral courts, the certification process is startling. Examined outside the con-
text of universal approval, certification permits unresolved questions of law
to cross boundaries and disrupt appellate hierarchy in unprecedented ways.72
Certification permits access to the state's highest court from a federal trial
court, before any judgment or decision has been entered in the trial court.
The district court's question may be accompanied by a "record" that is sim-
ply a complaint and briefs on a motion to dismiss. Further, the certification
rule permits interjurisdictional certification, from federal to state court. Be-
cause of these characteristics, the Ohio Rule, on its face, raises concerns
about the appellate process, advisory opinions, and mootness.
Certification and appeals within the same court system are hardly
unusual. Ohio, like many other states, permits intrajurisdictional conflict
certification within the Ohio court system: conflicts among Ohio Courts of
Appeals may be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court; the Court, at its discre-
tion, may certify and resolve the conflict.73 Under a conflict certification,
the Court reviews an established factual record, two trial court opinions, and
two courts of appeals decisions. In contrast to litigants in these intermediate
appellate courts, Ohio trial court litigants have no certification, direct appeal,
or other access to the Ohio Supreme Court, with one exception: where the
death penalty is imposed, there is direct appeal "as a matter of right., 74 Ohio
trial court decisions cannot travel directly to the Ohio Supreme Court 5 and
the exception, death penalty cases, reach the Court only on appeal, after trial
72. State law question certification rules in other jurisdictions provide for similar anomalies. See Appen-
dix A.
73. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO IV. In addition, many states will accept questions of state law from other
state courts. Thus, one state system will accept a question from another state system, usually at the same
level-e.g. state supreme court to state supreme court. Ohio is one of twenty-seven states declining interstate
certification, while twenty-one other states permit it. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of
Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125 (1992) (urging the use of
interstate certification and finding that courts "utterly fail to use the certification process in the state-to-state
context").
74. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO IX applies to death sentences for an offense committed on or after January 1,
1995.
75. Other states, however, do provide direct appeal from a trial court decision to the highest state court.
For example, Connecticut permits a direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court from the trial court "in an
action which involves a matter of substantial public interest and in which delay may work a substantial injus-
tice." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-265a (West 1991). This appeal is available after a decision is rendered in
the trial court. There are some state procedures that, like state law certification from federal trial courts, per-
mit "reserved," as yet undecided questions of law from the trial court to be reserved for the state supreme
court's resolution. CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 52-235 (West 1991); WYO. R. Civ. P. 52(c). Reserved ques-
tions are limited, however, by requirements similar to or more stringent than those for state law certification.
See, e.g., Koskoff, Koskoff & Beider v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 A.2d 818 (Conn. 1982) (holding that the Con-
necticut Supreme Court will consider reserved questions if there is a genuine dispute of significant questions
of law, the action is ready for a final judgment, the resolution of the reserved questions involves the public
interest, and the resolution of the questions would promote judicial economy).
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76and entry of judgment and sentence.
Within Ohio federal courts, the Sixth Circuit may seek to certify to
the United States Supreme Court "at any time ... any question of law in any
civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired. '' 77 After certifying
a question, the Court may "give binding instructions or require the entire
record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy. 7 8 This
federal certification provision somewhat resembles Ohio certification of
state law questions because the certifying court, the Sixth Circuit, has not
reached a final decision and seeks instructions from the United States Su-
preme Court. Federal certification, however, is rarely used, most likely be-
cause the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed one request,
noting an internal conflict within a circuit court of appeals "should not be the
occasion for invoking so exceptional a jurisdiction of this Court as that on
certification., 79  Unlike its enthusiasm for state law question certification,
the Supreme Court has discouraged federal certification by reminding the
Circuit Courts of Appeals that "except in rare instances," their task is "to
decide all properly presented cases coming before [them]., 80 The Supreme
Court's reluctance to accept certified questions underscores the difficulty
created by a procedure that requires a court of last resort to determine an
issue and deprives it of a lower court's reasoned decision and a developed
factual record.8'
Federal district courts' direct access to the United States Supreme
Court is equally limited. An appeal, but not certification before a decision, is
possible. A district court litigant may appeal a decision of a three-judge dis-
trict court panel directly to the United States Supreme Court.82 Such panels
are few and far between: a three-judge panel shall be convened "when oth-
erwise required by an Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging
the constitutionality of the apportionment of ...any statewide legislative
body., 83 In 1976, however, Congress greatly limited the use of three judge
76. This statement excepts extraordinary writs as a means of access to the Ohio Supreme Court.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2000).
78. Id.
79. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
80. Id. at 902. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1254; DAVID D. SIEGEL, COMMENTARY ON THE 1988 REVISION
(1989) (describing the Supreme Court's decision in Wisniewski as "a subtle suggestion that a court of appeals
invoking the certification statute is just passing the buck.").
81. See, e.g., Council on Judicial Administration & Committee on Federal Courts, Report and Recom-
mendations on the Second Circuit Certification of Determinative State Law Issues to the New York Court of
Appeals, 54 THE REcoRD 310, 311 (May-June 1999) ("By confining certification to the appellate level, the
Second Circuit ... assures that the questions are presented on a fully developed factual record.").
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
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panels in district courts, 4 and now such panels are most typically convened
to hear legislative apportionment cases.
In the alternative, a district court litigant could climb to the United
States Supreme Court most directly by securing a final decision in the dis-
trict court, 5 filing an appeal in the Sixth Circuit, and then petitioning for
certiorari.86 This path of ascent provides the Court with the district court
opinion and record if certiorari is granted before the Court of Appeals has
ruled. But, like other appellate "short cuts," "this is a power not ordinarily
to be exercised.,
87
Thus, within the Ohio court system, certification of a question of law
is is not an option unless two intermediate appellate courts are in conflict or
the issue is a trial court death sentence. Inside Ohio federal courts, the fed-
eral circuit court of appeals is discouraged from certifying questions to the
United States Supreme Court, appeals from three-judge district courts are
rare and granting certiorari before a circuit court rules is disfavored.88
In both systems, therefore, an intermediate appellate process nearly
always precludes trial court litigants from access or appeal directly to the
highest court. Sound policy considerations support this appellate structure.89
Further, only the rarely used federal certification process permits review of a
less than final judgment; the final judgment requirement supplies the highest
court with a lower court's reasoning, research, results, and records. The un-
usually abbreviated nature of the record in state law certification alarmed the
Clay dissenters when the majority put Florida's as yet unformulated certifi-
cation rule into use:
[t]he Supreme Court of Florida has never promulgated any such
[certification] rules, and evidently has never accepted such a cer-
tificate .... Perhaps state courts take no more pleasure than do
federal courts in deciding cases piecemeal on certificates. State
courts probably prefer to determine their questions of law with
84. Id. (amended in 1976 to conform with the repeal of sections 2281 and 2282).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000) (stating that cases in courts of appeals may be reviewed by writ of certio-
rari "before or after rendition ofjudgment or decree") (emphasis added).
87. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) (citing American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W.
Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 385 (1893)). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952)
(Burton, J. & Frankfurter, J., preferring to have the Circuit Court of Appeals issue a decision before granting
certiorari).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
89. Policies supporting this appellate process include the need for appellate courts to avoid making piece-




complete records of cases in which they can enter final judgments
before them.90
Further, the Ohio certification rule offers to federal courts unique ac-
cess to the court of last resort of another judicial system. The Rule permits
interjurisdictional certification. Thus, federal trial courts may gain access to
Ohio's highest court, a privilege rarely granted to Ohio trial courts. In
searching for a counterpart to state law question certification, state court
certiorari emerges as another interjurisdictional procedure between federal
and state courts.91 To petition for certiorari, state litigants must bring with
them "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision may be had . . ,92 Therefore, in this analogous inter-
jurisdictional procedure, access to the other court system requires a final
decision from the sister system's highest court.
Although the certification process grants early access to another ju-
risdiction's highest court that is unmatched in either judicial system, the pro-
cedure need not be summarily labeled ill-advised. The Rule may side-step
final judgments, leapfrog over the appellate process, and separates law from
fact, but there are limitations imposed. The Rule is invoked through broad
procedures that courts may not always discuss or fully apply. The certifying
and receiving courts must find "a question of Ohio law that may be determi-
native of the [federal] proceeding" and for which there is "no controlling
[Ohio Supreme Court] precedent., 93 These requirements must be met first in
federal court and then established through preliminary memoranda in the
Ohio Supreme Court to persuade the Court to accept the question.94  The
preliminary memoranda provide the Court the opportunity to analyze,
90. Clay, 363 U.S. at 227 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
92. Id. The subject matter is limited to
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its be-
ing repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States of where any ti-
tle, right, or privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution
or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States.
93. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII.
94. Id. at Section 6:
Within twenty days after a certification order is filed with the Ohio Supreme Court, each
party shall file a memorandum, not to exceed fifteen pages in length, addressing all
questions of law certified to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will review the
memoranda and issue an entry identifying the question or questions it will answer and
declining to answer the remaining question or questions. The Clerk of the Court shall
send a copy of the entry to the certifying court and to all parties or their counsel.
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whether certification requirements are met and if they are met, the court may
consider the merits of the question.95
Despite a required, separate inquiry into the certification standards,
the Ohio Supreme Court's responses lack consistent analysis of the criteria.
The federal certifying courts more frequently address the requirements, but
the courts may simply presume that the requirements are met and move
quickly to address the merits. This shared lack of attention to procedure may
stem from both courts' knowledge that certification decisions are discretion-
ary and not subject to review. 96 Parties in federal court may oppose, but not
appeal, a decision to certify a question to the Ohio Supreme Court.97 Once
in the Ohio Supreme Court, parties may argue against certification again, but
when the Court answers a question, the case returns to the federal court to
render a decision on the merits.98 If the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses or
declines to answer the question, this decision is unreviewable and the parties
return to federal court.99
On the federal side of the process, when a federal court refuses to
certify a question to the Ohio Supreme Court, the party seeking to certify
may, on appeal, raise that refusal, along with other issues, and may also re-
new a motion to certify in the Sixth Circuit. Such renewed motions to cer-
tify are routinely denied.'0o
95. In fact, the separate briefing came about in the 1994 revisions to the Rule because the Court had
issued orders declining to answer questions, but only after full merit briefs had been filed and considered. R.
PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII.
96. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (holding that the decision of a federal court to
certify questions of state law to state's highest court rests within sound discretion of court), cited in, Duryee v.
United States Dep't. of the Treasury, 6 F. Supp.2d 700, 704 (S.D. Ohio 1995). See also Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 376 (Fla. 1977) ("Mobil does not suggest that the Fifth Circuit's decision not to certify
a question is reviewable; plainly it is not.").
97. See, e.g., Mullins v. Rio Algom, Inc., Certification Order (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 1997) (despite defen-
dants' opposition to certification, the court found "issues in this case are appropriate for certification."); Tilley
v. McMackin, Certification Order (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 1990) ("Although petitioner has argued vigorously that
this Order of Certification is not necessary or agreeable, I disagree."). See also Nemours Fdn. v. Manganaro
Corp., New England, 878 F.2d 98, 101 (3rd Cir. 1989) (finding an "objection to having the Delaware Supreme
Court provide guidance in determining unsettled questions of state law is not important enough in a jurispru-
dential sense to require an immediate interlocutory appeal" and distinguishing such decision from an appeal-
able decision to abstain).
98. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. N.E. Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 1339 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling to reverse and remand
based on answer provided in, Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. N.E. Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 495 (Ohio 1999)); Burgess
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 995 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1993) (ruling to reverse and remand based on answer provided in,
Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1993)).
99. See, e.g., Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 1994 WL 6805 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 1994) (after the Ohio
Supreme Court declined to answer, Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1993), Sixth
Circuit holding that "if presented with the question, the Ohio Supreme Court would rule that an employee
must present some evidence of retaliation, in addition to the employer's enforcement of a valid, written pol-
icy.").
100. E.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 962 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court did
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2. The Ohio Supreme Court Should Consistently Apply the Rule's Require-
ments and Provide Reasoning for Dismissal and Declination Decisions
Although certification decisions may receive little review, both the
certifying and receiving courts remain bound by the requirements of: (1) "a
question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the [federal] proceeding,"
and (2) a question of Ohio law "for which there is no controlling precedent
in the decisions of [the Ohio] Supreme Court."''°  Thus, federal courts
should find the requirements met before certifying and the Ohio Supreme
Court should find them met before accepting and answering a question. Fur-
ther, in light of the unusual nature of certification as a cross-court system
procedure from the lowest to the highest court, the courts should articulate,
at least briefly, how they found the Rule's requirements were present or ab-
sent.
Court opinions where questions are dismissed or declined and not
answered by the Ohio Supreme Court represent a good opportunity for ar-
ticulating and applying the Rule. 0 2 Such opinions foster dialog between the
two court systems, the two individual courts, and their judges, counsel, and
litigants. Indeed, one presumed benefit of certification is to increase com-
munications between the two court systems. In opinions declining to accept
federal certified questions, the Ohio Supreme Court's exercise of discretion
under the Rule is made visible by its analysis and application of the Rule to
the questions before it. The Ohio Supreme Court has too frequently wasted
this opportunity.
10 3
Admittedly, neither court is required by Rule to explain a decision to
decline to certify or answer a question; both may exercise their discretion
without explaining their result. Without such explanation, particularly from
the Ohio Supreme Court, federal courts and future federal litigants receive
little guidance in improving certification practice.
not abuse discretion in declining to certify state law question and similarly declining to certify on appeal),
rev'd on other grounds, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002); The Fifth Column v. Village of Valley View, 221 F.3d
1334(6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished order) (holding same); MacDermid, Inc. v. Electrochemicals, Inc., 142 F.3d
435, 1998 WL 165137, **11 (6th Cir. (Ohio)) (unpublished) (holding same); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dur
Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding same).
101. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII.
102. Appendix C.
103. See text & notes, infra at 101. The federal courts typically have supplied fuller explanations for
certification. These courts have fully briefed certification motions in front to them in the first instance. Yet the
Ohio Supreme Court has an independent obligation to determine certification and to offer an explanation of
decisions to decline or to answer certified questions.
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The federal court's decision to decline to certify leaves the litigants
where they already were-in federal court. But, the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision will affect the litigants seeking access and also educate federal
courts and future litigants about the proper nature, scope, and phrasing of a
certified question. Thus, in the cases where the Court declines,' 4 analyzing
the Rule's requirements and explaining the result is desirable.
The Ohio Supreme Court has offered some guidance when dismiss-
ing certified questions. In three dismissals, the parties had settled and with-
drawn the matter; thus, the Court dismissed the case before any rulings. 105
Yet when dismissing a case for "want of prosecution," the Court chose not to
write an opinion to educate courts and attorneys about its certification proc-
ess. 106
Fortunately, when the parties returned to the Sixth Circuit, the certi-
fying court, it took up the task by issuing opinions detailing how the plain-
tiff's attorney failed to comply with the Ohio Supreme Court's certification
briefing rules. 07 It describes the Court's procedures, the attorney's errors,
and concludes the attorney made "an honest mistake," and permits the case
to go forward.'0 8 The Sixth Circuit wrote to educate federal attorneys and to
encourage them to comply with Ohio certification requirements: "The publi-
cation of this order will doubtless embarrass the plaintiffs lawyer, and we
hope it will forestall such mistakes by other lawyers in the future."'10 9
The dissenter, however, would have dismissed the federal case for
want of prosecution, rejecting the excuses offered for failure to file the re-
quired brief in the Ohio Supreme Court." 0
Thus, the federal court, not the Ohio Supreme Court, enforced and
discussed explicitly the Ohio certification rule. This task belonged in the
first instance to the Ohio Supreme Court. It should have claimed the oppor-
tunity, rather than leaving the task to its federal counterpart."' Three other
104. In the fifty-five cases reaching the Court, it declined to answer ten times.
105. Sun Co., Inc. v. Crosby Valve & Gauge Co., No. 94-2410 Request for Withdrawal of Certified Ques-
tion Granted and Cause Dismissed (Ohio Dec. 20, 1994) (parties' letter indicated they had settled and certified
question rendered moot); Culp v. Toledo, 573 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio 1991) (parties settled and request order of
reference be withdrawn; cause dismissed); Gregory v. Dold, 555 N.E.2d 1306 (Ohio 1990) ("Upon joint appli-
cation to dismiss, this cause is hereby dismissed.").
106. Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 598 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992) (table of decisions) ("Sua sponte,
cause dismissed for want of prosecution.").
107. Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 984 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1993).
108. Id. at 748 (describing failure to file brief required by R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII § 7(A)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 749 (Milbum, J., dissenting).
111. The Court did decline to answer questions when it was deprived of the "benefit of the preliminary
memorandums [sic] from the parties," but the opinion did not discuss the certification rules, briefing sched-
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dismissals were made "sua sponte," or in response to a motion to dismiss,
without the text of the certified questions appearing in the opinion.
212
Within the ten opinions where the Ohio Supreme Court expressly de-
clined to answer, its record for articulating its reasoning is uneven. The
Court has chosen to articulate its reasoning only sporadically. 113 In four of
the ten cases declining an answer, the Court explained its results and entered
into the interjurisdictional exchange. These opinions, like those in sister
jurisdictions, create useful certification precedent.
For example, the Court has published the text of a certified question
and explained that such a fact specific question was inappropriate for certifi-
cation. 4  The Court also refused questions that were certified from federal
court, when the litigants were improperly seeking a second opinion. 115 When
the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Sixth Circuit."16  Recognizing there was no controlling Ohio
precedent on the state law issue, the Sixth Circuit predicted the law as it be-
lieved the Ohio Supreme Court would, applied the law, and reversed and
remanded the case to the district court." i7  Returning to district court, the
unhappy plaintiff persuaded the federal district court judge to certify the
question to the Ohio Supreme Court. 1 8  But, the Ohio Supreme Court
stopped this gamesmanship by explicitly stating the plaintiff had inappropri-
ately requested it to "intervene between the federal appellate and district
courts."' 19 Although the opinion was simply a few sentences, it included the
text of the question asked and expressly stated the reasons for declining to
answer the question. 120
Aside from these useful opinions describing why questions were de-
ules, or deadlines. Platte v. Ford Motor Co., 738 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio 2000).
112. F. & G. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Strayhom Lim. Servs., 613 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1993); Corwin v. Ford
Motor Co., 633 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1994); Baker v. Pease Co., 641 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1994); Roth v. Capital
Amer. Life Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1994); Tilley v. McMackin, 573 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1991).
113. Compare Broadview Savings & Loan Co. v. Reistenberg, 550 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 1990) (declining to
answer because inappropriate to intervene between two federal courts) with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cutcher, 654
N.E.2d 980 (Ohio 1995) (declining to answer without explanation).
114. Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1993) ("The court declines to answer the
question ... because it is not appropriate for this court to answer certified questions of state law that are so
factually specific in nature.").
115. Broadview Savings & Loan Co., 550 N.E.2d at 949.
116. Id. ("Respondent appealed to the Sixth Circuit.").
117. Id. ("That court recognized there was no controlling Ohio law on this point, but applied the law as it
predicted this court would apply it .... ).
118. Id. This district court decision is further discussed infra at 119.
119. Id.
120. The remaining decision providing a reason for declining to answer is Baker v. Pease, 641 N.E.2d 201
(Ohio 1994), where previously an automatic stay was granted "on notice of bankruptcy filing," Baker v. Pease,
578 N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 1991).
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clined, the Ohio Supreme Court has chosen not to explain its reasons for
declining to answer other certified question.1 21  Even without explanation,
the Court could publish the text of the question it declined to answer. But,
when the Court has declined to answer a question, it has not consistently
included the text of the certified questions. In five cases, the text is absent;
in five cases, the text appears.122 In all cases, the Court declined to answer
without further discussion from majority or dissenters.1 23
Ohio is not alone in its practice of summary dismissals and dis-
sents.124 Its decisions declining to answer, like a denial of certiorari, convey
no opinion on the merits of the certified question. 25 Yet, a brief, reasoned
opinion when declining to answer would help avoid federal court frustration
and misinterpretation of silence, as well as expressly enforce the policies and
practice of Ohio certification.1 26  These additional opinions could further
121. Hunter v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 759 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2001); Schaffer v. State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co., 748 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 2001); Eabens v. U.S. Air, 670 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Cutcher, 654 N.E.2d 980 (Ohio 1995); Roth v. Capital American Life. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1994);
Corwin v. Ford Motor Co., 633 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1994); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters v. Strayhom
Limo. Serv., 613 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1993); Tilley v. McMackin, 573 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1991).
122. Compare Corwin, 633 N.E.2d at 542 (declining to answer and omitting question text from opinion);
Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 613 N.E.2d at 235 (same); Tilley, 573 N.E.2d at 665 (same); Allstate Ins. Co., 654
N.E.2d at 980 (same) with Watkins v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 759 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2001) (declining to
answer and including question text in opinion); Kemper v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 758 N.E.2d 184
(Ohio 2001) (same); Eabens, 670 N.E.2d at 1000 (same); Schaffer, 748 N.E.2d at 545 (same); Hunter, 759
N.E.2d at 784 (same).
123. See, e.g., Allstate, 654 N.E,2d at 980 (Douglas & Pfeifer, JJ., dissenting from ruling that "The court
declines to answer the certified questions."); Platte, 738 N.E.2d at 379 (Sweeney & Pfeifer, JJ., dissenting
from ruling that "The court declines to answer the certified questions."); Corwin, 633 N.E.2d at 542 (Douglas
& Sweeney, JJ., dissenting from ruling that "Sua sponte, this court declines to answer the certified question..
• .11).
124. See, e.g., Vt. Rules of App. P. 14(a) (West 2001) ("The Court in its discretion may decline to answer
any question certified to it and need not state reasons for its action."). See also Bryan M. Schneider, "'But
Answer There Came None": The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 273, 315 (1995) ("The Michigan Supreme Court, to say the least, is not very receptive to the
certified question. Not only does the court refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails to state the
reasons for its refusal." Also noting with approval three cases where Michigan Supreme Court supplied rea-
soning when declining to answer); Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question... 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 677, 681-682 n.19 (1995) (citing cases where state courts refuse to answer certified questions, but
offer little or no explanation).
125. See Richard Alan Chase, Note, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions: Are Inferences
Permitted?, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 407, 422 (1992) (arguing decision to decline to answer is neither decision
on merits nor suggestion of court's view of the merits). But see Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 163 F.3d 329, 331
(6th Cir. 1995) (Engle, J., concurring) ("However, I agree that we are bound to honor our prior decision as a
matter of stare decisis and that this is, if anything, reinforced by the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to take
action on our petition for certification.").
126. The most recent decisions reflect an increase, not decrease, in summary decisions, but four opinions
include the question text. Wojcik v. Option One Mtge, Corp., 762 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2002) (summary declin-
ing to answer); In re Miller, 762 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio 2002) (same); In re Franz, 761 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2002)
(same); Golem v. Put-In-Bay, 761 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2002) (same).
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discourage litigants and courts from misusing the certification process,127 and
offer useful guidance to federal courts and federal litigants.
Some sister state jurisdictions with certified question procedures en-
dorse "the mutually beneficial practice of stating the grounds for their deci-
sions" to decline to certify or to decline to answer. 128 The New York Court
of Appeals, in declining to answer certified questions, has issued five pub-
lished opinions offering full explanations that "have helped certifying [fed-
eral] courts to avoid similar pitfalls in the future.' 29 The five decisions were
among forty-four certification requests the court received between 1985 and
2000.130 The New York decisions denying certification were not lengthy, but
consistently and explicitly addressed the criteria for certification that were
not met. All five decisions include the exact text or close paraphrase of the
certified questions before the court.
131
The New York court explicitly identified the missing criteria that
caused it to decline to answer -the question. 132 Thus, when the answer to the
certified question may be rendered moot, it can not be determinative of the
issue in federal court, thus, the New York court declined to answer.133 Fur-
ther, the court exhibited a concern for advisory opinions by recognizing that
by their nature, coming before the court on an uncertain factual basis, certi-
fied questions create this risk because they are either too "[a]bstract or
overly-generalized" or too "fact and case-specific.' 34 Legal issues, in addi-
tional to factual issues, raise concerns in certified questions and may result
in a decision to decline to answer. For example, where the certifying court
127. See, e.g., Copper, 621 N.E.2d at 396 ("not appropriate for this court to answer certified questions of
state law that are so factually specific in nature."); Broadview Savings & Loan Co., 550 N.E.2d at 949 (declin-
ing to answer where Sixth Circuit had already predicted state law).
128. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 65, at 405 (2000) (describing usefulness of the five decisions issued by
New York State Court of Appeals when declining to answer questions certified to it by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals).
129. Id. at 420. The five opinions are: Tunick v. Safir, 731 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 2000); Yesil v. Reno, 705
N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1998); Grabois v. Jones, 667 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1996); Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lash-
lee, 525 N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1988); Rufino v.United States, 506 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1987).
130. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 65, at app. B (list of forty-four certified questions of appeal sent to the
New York Court of Appeals).
131. Tunick, 731 N.E.2d at 597; Yesil, 705 N.E.2d at 655; Grabois, 667 N.E.2d at 307; Retail Software,
525 N.E.2d at 737; Rufino, 506 N.E.2d at 910 n.*.
132. Yesil, 705 N.E.2d at 656 ("[W]e note our uncertainty whether the certified questions can be determi-
native of the underlying matters [in federal court]."); Retail Software, 525 N.E.2d at 737 ("we now conclude
that the question, as proffered, does not satisfy our ... requirement that the question certified 'may be deter-
minative of the cause . . . pending in the certifying court. Therefore, we must decline to answer the ques-
tion.") (citation omitted).
133. Tunick, 731 N.E.2d at 598 ("the questions come to us in the unique posture that, once accepted, they
may become moot ... ").
134. Yesil, 705 N.E.2d at 656.
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seeks an answer to a legal issue not raised by the litigants in the certified
question, the New York Court declined to answer. 135 Further, the legal issue
raised in the certified question may already be proceeding in that state court
system where the state appellate process would eventually resolve it. The
highest court in New York favored the state appellate process over the trun-
cated route of certification; it declined to answer, preferring "the benefit af-
forded by our normal process-the considered deliberation and writing of
our intermediate appellate court in a pending litigation."'' 36 In contrast, some
certified questions are more properly resolved first in the federal court sys-
tem and thus are declined by the highest New York state court.1 37 In addi-
tion to New York, other state courts also write published opinions to explain
their decisions to decline to answer certified questions and thus promote un-
derstanding between the two court systems. 1
38
A court's need to explain why a certified question was declined re-
sembles other exercises of discretion, including the decision to deny an inter-
locutory appeal in federal court.1 39  For example, neither the district court
nor the federal circuit court of appeals need offer reasoning for their discre-
tionary decisions to deny interlocutory appeals pursuant to section
1292(b).' 40 Like the Ohio certification rule, section 1292(b) guides the
judge's exercise of discretion with similar criteria: the appeal "may materi-
ally advance" the end of the litigation and there is a "controlling question of
law that is unsettled. 41  Federal litigants learn little from federal circuit
judge orders that deny the appeal without explanation in unpublished or-
135. Tunick, 731 N.E.2d at 599 ("This Court could not responsibly engage on that question where the
parties to the litigation have not sought relief under this State's Constitution and the issue would be first
briefed and raised in our Court.").
136. Rufino, 506 N.E.2d at 911 (declining to answer because similar legal issue already proceeding through
the state court system).
137. Grabois, 667 N.E.2d at 307 ("the interplay between Federal and State law in interpreting issues of
statutory construction under ERISA is as yet not fully settled. This issue may thus be more appropriate for
resolution in the first instance by the Federal courts.").
138. See, e.g., Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Ore.
1990) (eight-page opinion declining to answer by explaining, "first in general terms and then in terms applica-
ble to the present case, the considerations that lead us to denial" and finding that there is controlling precedent
on the issue); Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989) (declining questions that are too hypothetical
and where answer would not be determinative of the issue).
139. See generally Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1201-04 (1990) [hereinafter Revitalizing].
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): "When a district court judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as
to where there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such an order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of such an appeal of such an action may thereupon, in its discretion,




ders.142 District court judges also typically fail to provide more than "a rote
recitation of the [section 1292(b)] criteria" in their interlocutory appeal or-
ders. 1
43
The need to explain certification denials is greater than the need to
explain interlocutory appeals. Because it is an interjurisdictional certifica-
tion process, state law certified questions call upon two different court sys-
tems, not two levels of the same system, to communicate. The Ohio Su-
preme Court could further this communication by reciting and applying cer-
tification criteria explicitly in its orders and opinions.
The process of denying either an interlocutory appeal or certiorari,
however, traditionally has not required any explanation. The Ohio Supreme
Court's role may be analogous to the United States Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari: explanations are neither desirable nor possible, and denial sug-
gests no view of the case's merits.' 44 When declining to accept certified
questions, the Ohio Supreme Court has issued orders without reasoning, ex-
planation, or even the text of the questions asked.
The analogy to certiorari, however, becomes less persuasive in view
of the policies underlying the unexplained denial of certiorari. The United
State Supreme Court reviews thousands of certiorari petitions annually; thus,
"[p]ractical considerations preclude" the Court from explaining the reasons
for each denial. 145 Further, the reasons informing certiorari denial are legion
and encompass technical concerns, such as lack of final judgment, as well as
policy concerns, such as desiring the lower courts to develop additional as-
pects of the issues before a United States Supreme Court decision.
46
In comparison, the Ohio Supreme Court faces many fewer requests
for certification of state law issues, with fifty-five requested and addressed
in the last fourteen years. 47 The decision to certify or decline is more nar-
rowly defined by the Rule's requirements and less likely to be informed by
142. Revitalizing, supra note 139, at 1202 (circuit court orders denying (or granting) interlocutory appeals
are rarely published and the decision not to publish is supported by the orders' lack of legal analysis). See also
Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocu-
tory Review by the United States Court of Appeals Under Rule 2369, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1586
(2000) (urging that federal courts of appeals issue opinions when denying (or granting) permission to appeal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), permitting discretionary appeals from district court orders denying (or granting)
class certification).
143. Revitalizing, supra note 139, at 1203.
144. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Transworld Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.l (1973).
145. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912,918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J).
146. Id. at 918.
147. See Appendix C. While the Ohio Supreme Court's certification opinions are readily discovered, the
number of requests for certification in federal courts is less accessible and certain. Certification requests may
often be denied in unpublished federal court opinions.
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the host of considerations facing the United States Supreme Court. State law
certifications are more like interlocutory appeals than certiorari petitions:
there are fewer to decide and the decisions involve fewer and more defined
criteria. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court is in a better position to explain its
certification decisions. And even the United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the benefits of explaining the reasoning behind a certiorari de-
nial. "It is of course not possible to explain the reasons supporting every
order denying a petition for writ of certiorari. An occasional explanation,
however, may allay the possible concern that this Court is not faithfully per-
forming its responsibilities."
' 141
3. Assessing Ohio Supreme Court Procedures in Answers to Certified Ques-
tions
In the present study, the Ohio Supreme Court supplied answers, in
whole or part, in thirty-six certified question opinions. 149 Setting aside the
substantive merits of these decisions, they also provide the Court a chance to
refine the policies and practice of state law question certification. In addi-
tion to Practice Rule XVIII, the Court requires that certified questions be
questions of law, not fact. 50 Next, by answering a certified question, the
Court does not exercise jurisdiction over the federal case; the Court may
affect the case's outcome by its answer, but the federal court exercises juris-
diction and ultimately decides the case.' 5 ' The state court declares the state
law, and the federal court then applies that law to the facts of the case before
it.' 52 Before answering, the Court should determine if the proposed ques-
tions: (1) are questions of law; (2) are questions that may be determinative of
the issue; and (3) lack answers from the controlling precedent of the Ohio
Supreme Court.
Before turning to the merits of the case, therefore, the Ohio Supreme
Court should determine if the certified questions are framed purely "as ques-
tions of law, not fact.' 53 Framing such questions of law is no easy task, and
the Ohio Supreme Court has offered little guidance or discussion of the
148. Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928, 928 (1982) (Stevens, J.), cited in Michael J. Broyde, The Intercir-
cuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White 's Dissents from Denials of Certiorari
During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 610,610 (1987).
149. See Appendix C, right column.
150. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1079.




problem of question framing. It declined to answer a question, explaining "it
[was] not appropriate for this court to answer certified questions of state law
that are so factually specific in nature."' 54 At least one federal judge heard
this concern and asserted in later certification requests that the question
asked was not fact specific, but his efforts brought mixed results. 55 Despite
declining a question that was too factually specific, the Court has answered,
without comment, questions specifically tied to "the facts of this case."
156
The inconsistent treatment threatens to render this threshold requirement
meaningless.
Formulating a pure question of law presents a difficult task, but ig-
noring the difficulty serves no useful purpose. Mixed questions of law and
fact that are deemed too fact-specific and unacceptable, should be identified
as flawed, and the text of the flawed questions should be included in the text
of the opinion. Publishing the text of the question declined would educate
federal courts, and also keep the Ohio Supreme Court on task by displaying
its decision fully and being held to its announced precedent to limit certified
questions to questions of law.
When faced with the same "pure question of law" difficulty, a sister
state court analyzed and addressed the requirement explicitly, identifying
and responding directly to the certifying federal court's struggles to frame
pure questions of law.157 The Mississippi Supreme Court, like its counter-
part in Ohio, read its rule to contemplate answering only "pure questions of
law," but found the questions sent to it were "in the nature of law application
questions-what results from applying the rules of law to the facts of the
case?-rather than pure questions of law as to what is the law of Mississippi
on a particular point.' ' 158 The Court expressly noted the questions' flaws, but
then, "in the spirit of federalism," and because six years had passed since the
154. Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1993). The certified question asked:
"Whether an employer's discharge of an employee for failing to file request for leave forms pursuant to an
established medical leave policy violated Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.90 where the employer is aware that the
employee's work-related injury was the cause of his continued absence from work?" Id.
155. See, e.g., Rolfv. Tri State Motor Transit, 745 N.E.2d 424 (Ohio 2001) (district court order stated "the
certified question is not fact specific" and question was answered); Platte v. Ford Motor Co., 738 N.E.2d 379
(Ohio 2000) (district court order stated questions "not fact specific" and Court declined to answer the certified
questions).
156. Schaffer v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 748 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 2001) ("Is Ohio Revised Code §
3937.18(G), as amended by Senate Bill 20, effective October 20, 1994, unconstitutional on any grounds under
the facts of this case, including those stated by the Plaintiffs?") (emphasis added); Beagle v. Warden, 676
N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 1997) ("Is Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18(A) (2) unconstitutional on any grounds under the
facts of this case, including those stated by Plaintiffs?") (emphasis added).
157. Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So.2d 1024, 1028-31 (Miss. 1985).
158. Id. at 1028.
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plaintiff had suffered serious injuries, it stepped forward to address what
were technically "law application," not "law declaration," questions. 
5 9
Acknowledging the questions' formulation could lead them to de-
cline to answer, the court found that "there must be some give and take" be-
tween the federal court and it, as the receiving court. 60 The court decided to
answer the question as best it could because "it hardly befits our role in the
constitutionally ordained enterprise of federalism to act like a stick in the
mud whenever the questions certified are not pure law declaration ques-
tions.' 6' The decision to answer the questions may have been unwise, but
the court fully acknowledged its own requirements and then explained its
decision to answer, rather than decline, the flawed questions. 62 The Ohio
Supreme Court should play a similar role in explaining why it would accept
questions that technically fail to comply with its Rule or its own certification
precedent.
In addition to inconsistency in requiring questions of law, the Ohio
Supreme court has an uneven record of accepting questions when the spe-
cific legal basis for the question is not defined. The failure to ask a specific
legal question presents a serious problem because if the questions do not
define the legal issues, then the Court could simply sua sponte address the
legal issues it wished to have resolved. 63 For example, the Ohio Supreme
Court accepted and answered, without comment, the question: "Is Ohio Re-
vised Code § 3937.18(A)(2) unconstitutional on any grounds under the facts
of this case, including those stated by the Plaintiff?"' 64 The question invited,
and the Court accepted, the opportunity to use any legal grounds available to
hold the statute unconstitutional, whether the plaintiff had raised the issue or
not. Yet, the Court later declined to answer a very similarly phrased ques-
tion: "Is Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18(G), as amended Senate Bill 20, effec-
tive October 20, 1994, unconstitutional on any grounds under the facts of
this case, including those stated by Plaintiffs?"'165 Again, the Court failed to
159. Id. at 1030-31.
160. Id. at 1030.
161. Id. at 1031.
162. See McIntyre v. Farrel Corp., 680 So.2d 858, 860 (Miss. 1996) ("[T]his Court has at times shown a
willingness to address the particular facts of the case, and even, for all practical purposes, to issue a holding
based on the facts of the case.") (citations omitted).
163. See, e.g., Tunick v. Safir, 731 N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 2000) ("This Court could not responsibly engage
on that question where the parties to the litigation have not sought relief under this State's Constitution and the
issue would be first briefed and raised in our Court."); Guy v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 367 A.2d 946,
949 (Md. 1977) (declining to address issues that the certified question did not encompass).
164. Beagle v. Warden, 676 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 1997) (emphasis added).
165. Schaffer v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 748 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 2001) (declining to answer and including
text of question) (emphasis added).
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discuss the Rule, the question's success or failure in meeting requirements,
or another reason why it declined to answer the question as framed.
The Court's uneven record in requiring certified questions to be pre-
cisely framed, to identify a specific legal ground, and to be neither too fact
specific nor abstract, leaves it vulnerable to criticism that it accepts or de-
clines questions based on its own desires to strike down, uphold or interpret
state statutes or other state law. Further, by choosing not to explain its deci-
sions to decline or answer certified questions, the Court does little to develop
the law of certification for itself or for the federal courts sending it ques-
tions.
Certified questions entering the Ohio Supreme Court should be for-
mulated as question of law and should also be ones "that may be determina-
tive of the proceeding.' ' 66 The "determinative" requirement is not absolute,
but its purpose is to avoid issuing advisory opinions 16 that will have no ef-
fect upon the federal litigation. 168 Further, it keeps the state courts from an-
swering questions that the federal court judge has already answered. 169
Unfortunately, the Court rendered one decision while acknowledging
its answer could play no role, not some role, in determining the outcome of
the federal proceeding. In federal court, the judge, sua sponte, simultane-
ously ordered briefing on the issue of a state statute's constitutionality and
on the issue of certifying the question of constitutionality to the Ohio Su-
preme Court. 170 The federal court held the state statute constitutional, reject-
ing claims it violated right to trial by jury and equal protection principles.'71
Then, the court found federal diversity jurisdiction no longer existed. 172 Fi-
nally, with the case ended, the court certified the question of the statute's
constitutionality to the Ohio Supreme Court.
173
Understandably, the Ohio Supreme Court expressed some confusion
when it received a question the federal court had already answered to deter-
mine the outcome of the case. It observed: "Upon reviewing the briefs of the
166. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII § 1.
167. Carberry v. City of Ashtabula, 757 N.E.2d 307, 310 (Ohio 2001) ("It is well settled that we will not
indulge in advisory opinions.").
168. See generally John L. Deweerdt, Comment, Inter-jurisdictional Certification and Full Faith and
Credit in the Federal Courts, 45 WASH. L. REv. 167, 170-71 (1970) (requiring that certified questions may be
determinative of outcome avoids risk of state court issuing advisory opinions).
169. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 35 ("Some courts prefer not to answer a question already answered
by the federal court.").
170. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., No. C2-87-1548, Order Certifying Questions of State Law to the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, 6 (Dec. 20, 1989).





parties, the trial court issued an order reiterating its prior holding that R.C.
4121.80 is constitutional .... Nevertheless, the trial court certified the cause
to this court to determine whether R.C. 4121.80 is unconstitutional in whole
or in part under Ohio law., 174 Without referring to the Rule's requirement of
a question with an answer that may be determinative of the federal proceed-
ing, the Court accepted and then answered the question. 175 Apparently wish-
ing to reach the issue and "reverse" the federal court, the Court issued an
advisory opinion in response to a certified question by failing to consider the
Rule's provisions. 1
76
Having decided to reach the issue, the Ohio Supreme Court also de-
cided to accept a broadly framed question that would allow it to address the
statute's constitutionality on any legal basis: "Whether R.C. 4121.80 is un-
constitutional in whole or in part under the Ohio Constitution?' ' 77 There-
fore, the Court held the entire statute unconstitutional, without considering
the "propriety of any of the arguments [raised in the district court]."' 78
The Brady decision exemplifies the potential power available to the
state's highest court through certification when the procedure's safeguards
are ignored. The court acknowledged implicitly that its answer could not
determine the federal proceeding, yet still accepted certification. 17 9 Outside
certification, however, the Ohio Supreme Court has declined to answer when
an issue will not be determinative, and thus declined to issue an advisory
opinion.180 When asked to decide the constitutionality of a new tax statute,
the Court found the request was too general and abstract.18' Thus, the Court
has held it will not determine a statute's constitutionality unless "the ques-
tion of constitutionality ... determines the case before it.' 82 Similarly, the
Brady Court should have declined to address the constitutionality of a statute
when the question had already been answered and the case determined by the
174. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 723 (Ohio 1991) (syllabus) (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 724.
176. The Court's opinion did serve as an appeal. The district court reversed its earlier decision and granted
the employer summary judgment. The plaintiff employee, who had won in district court, but lost in the Ohio
Supreme Court, appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision, but
cited to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in support of its result. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 966 F.2d
1451 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion).
177. Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 724.
178. Id. at 728.
179. Id. Other federal and state courts outside Ohio have rejected certification when the federal court has
already reached a decision on the issue. See, e.g., Perkins v. Clark Equip. Co., 823 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.
1987) ("Once a question is submitted for decision in the district court, the parties should be bound by the
outcome .... Only in limited circumstances should certification be granted after a case has been decided.").
180. State ex rel. Park Investment Co., 285 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Ohio 1972).
181. Id.




By Rule XVIII's second requirement, the Ohio Supreme Court
should also decline to answer a question when there is Court precedent al-
ready available to answer it. Typically, the receiving court declines to an-
swer when this requirement has not been met, then cites, without discussion,
the available, controlling precedent. Thus, because there was controlling
precedent available, a state supreme court cited its precedent and concluded
it was "inappropriate to accept certification ....
The Ohio Supreme Court has, in four cases, stayed or delayed an an-
swer to a certified question to await controlling precedent that would be is-
sued in response to other cases then pending before the Court. 84 This prac-
tice, similar to that for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, rea-
sonably allows for delaying an answer rather than declining to answer when
an answer will be given shortly in a similar case.
In a less prudent practice, the Ohio Supreme Court has accepted and
answered certified questions where controlling precedent already existed. 85
Rule XVIII indicates the Court should decline the question and cite the "con-
trolling precedent." But, the Court accepted and answered the question "in
the affirmative," rather than declining the question, and then cited the con-
trolling precedent. 18
6
In contrast, in the absence of controlling precedent, the Court should
accept the question and issue a decision to supply an answer and create new
precedent. 187  Yet the Court has accepted questions, answered them in the
affirmative, but cited no authority for its decision. 188  Thus, the Court has
found no previous controlling precedent, but created new precedent based on
183. Western Helicopter, 811 P.2d at 635.
184. Mullins v. Rio Algom, Inc., 708 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio 1999) (stayed until decision in Johnson v. BP
Chemical, Inc., 7070 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1999)); Cheek v. Industrial Powder Coatings, 706 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio
1999) (stayed until decision in Genaro v. Central Trans. Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999)); Yepko v. State
Farm Mut. Ins., 683 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio 1997) (stayed until decision in Holt v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 683
N.E.2d 1080 (Ohio 1997)); Garlikov v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 623 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ohio 1993) (full briefing
over eleven months; ruling that the holding in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1993),
"directly answers the question posed.").
185. Taylor v. National Group of Companies, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio 1992) ("The certified question is
answered in the affirmative.). See Elek v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (Ohio 1991). Cf. Hoops
v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, 553 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio 1990).
186. Id.
187. The certified question must also be one that "may be determinative of the proceeding." R. PRAC. SUP.
CT. OHIO XVIII § 1.
188. Henderson v. Lincoln Nat'l Speciality Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 1994) ("Does Ohio Revised
Code § 3937.18 apply to an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy if insurance covering vehicles
registered and principally garaged in Ohio, when said policy was not delivered, or issued for delivery in Ohio
by the insurer? The certified question is answered in the affirmative.").
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four words-answered in the affirmative. This absence of analysis and cita-
tion gained a dissenter's criticism for an opinion issued "without opinion" or
"explanation." 189  Similarly, the Court accepted two cases without control-
ling precedent, but then failed to create useful new precedent; it answered
"in the negative," without discussion or citation. 190
The better practice would be to comply with the Rule's purpose and
avoid new precedent when controlling precedent already exists. Like its
sister jurisdictions, the Court would decline and cite the existing controlling
precedent, rather than answering a specific certified question and unneces-
sarily creating new controlling precedent based on the isolated legal issue
and bare facts of a certified question. Where no controlling precedent exists,
the Court should accept and answer the question but provide analysis and
citation beyond an answer in the "affirmative" or "negative."'
' 91
4. Assessing the Merits of Ohio Supreme Court Answers to Certified Ques-
tions
In the period studied, the Ohio Supreme Court has issued thirty-six
certified question opinions, with three of these answers creating new Ohio
causes of action-two tort claims-and one recognizing the validity of
spendthrift trusts.192  Certified question opinions, like any other precedent
created by a state's highest court, may address issues of first impression and
recognize new causes of action. 193 Such questions are appropriate for certifi-
cation when the federal court has few indicators of what the highest state
court would be likely to do when a doctrine or cause of action has already
split other jurisdictions. Court opinions recognizing new claims in response
189. Id. at 658 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
190. Poe v. Trumbull County, 694 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio 1998) ("answered in the negative," with no addi-
tional text); Krejci v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1993) (same),
191. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 2002 WL 753924 (N.Y. April 30, 2002); (answering certified
questions "in the negative" or not answered as "unnecessary," following a five-page opinion); Guy v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 367 A. 2d 946, 949 (Md. 1977) (answering "the certified question in the affirmative" with
factual summary and discussion of statutory interpretation and legislative history at issue).
192. Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing the tort of interference with expec-
tation or inheritance); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing tort of spo-
liation of evidence); Scott v. Bank One Trust, 577 N.E.2d at 1084 (overruling Sherrow v. Brookover, 189
N.E.2d 90 (Ohio 1963) and enforcing spendthrift trusts in Ohio).
193. See, e.g., Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466, 476 (Tenn. 2000) (answering question by
deriving elements of civil statutory claim of malicious harassment from crime of civil right intimidation);
Willis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 648, 649 (W.Va. 1998) (answering question recognizing claim for
same-gender sexual harassment under W.Va. Human Rights Act); Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d
1308, 1309 (Wyoming 1991) (answering question of imposing implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
upon an employer); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 821 (Mont. 1993) (answering question of
parental immunity against tort claim brought by unemancipated child against parent).
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to certified questions should be no different than any other opinion perform-
ing the same task. The court should summarize material facts; balance com-
peting policy considerations; cite authority from within and outside the state;
and clearly state the elements of the new claim. In cases of first impression
that progressed through the state court system, the Ohio Supreme Court has
consistently supplied such analysis in its opinions.1 94
Yet, when the Court accepted certified questions in three cases rais-
ing claims as yet unrecognized in Ohio, it broke with its usual pattern of ex-
plication in two of them.' 95 In its first certified question opinion answering
an issue of first impression, the Court acknowledged that certification was
not designed to change state law precedent, but that it should not refrain
from changing state precedent simply because the state law issue "arose in
federal court., 196 Thus, when asked if Ohio found spendthrift trusts valid
and enforceable, the Court examined its precedent and overruled it, conclud-
ing that "[t]he policy reasons against spendthrift trusts, which seemed so
strong then, now look weak.' ' 197 The Court established that creating Ohio
precedent should not be avoided simply because the law in question arose in
a federal certified question.198 Further, the Court issued a full opinion with
facts, analysis of precedent, and current policy considerations when it chose
to recognize and enforce spendthrift trusts in Ohio.
Yet the Court has recognized two new tort claims in response to cer-
tified questions by issuing opinions nearly devoid of all fact, law or legal
analysis. First, the Court accepted certified questions concerning spoliation
of evidence claims: "Does Ohio recognize a claim for intentional or negli-
gent spoliation of evidence and/or tortious interference with prospective liti-
gation?"'199 The certified question was compound and difficult to parse. It
asked three questions, not one. The federal court asked if Ohio recognized:
(1) a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence; (2) a claim for intentional
spoliation of evidence; or (3) a claim for tortious interference with prospec-
194. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 226-27 (Ohio 1996) (ad-
dressing new claim of"wrongful living"); Adair v. Wozniak, 492 N.E.2d 426, 428 (Ohio 1986) (addressing
shareholder claim brought as result of third party wrongful acts that harm the corporation and analyzing Ohio
and other jurisdictions' law).
195. Smith v. Howard Johnson, 615 N.E.2d at 1038 (including text of certified questions and one paragraph
response); Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 202-03 (including text of certified questions and answering yes, a claim is
recognized and listing five elements of claim).
196. Scott, 577 N.E.2dat 1082.
197. Id. at 1084 (deciding to overturn precedent and issuing seven-page opinion).
198. Accord Kolanovic v. Gida, 77 F. Supp.2d 595, 606 (D.N.J. 1999) (declining to create New Jersey
claim for negligent spoliation of evidence because New Jersey state courts should make that choice).




The Court's response merged the questions, deleted terms, and added
terms, but did not indicate that it was re-phrasing the question in order to
frame a response. It stated: "A cause of action exists in tort for interference
with or destruction of evidence. ' '200 The answer does not address the
division between negligent and intentional conduct; does not use the
question's term "spoliation, 20' but indicates the tort claim arises from
interference with evidence or destruction of evidence. The answer does not
address the "tortious interference with a prospective civil claim" language,
suggesting it is merged into the interference and destruction claim.
The Court listed the elements of the new claim: "pending or probable
litigation involving the plaintiff; knowledge on the part of the defendant that
litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of the evidence by de-
fendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case, (4) disruption of the plain-
tiffs case, and damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts., 20 2 The
elements limited the Court's earlier label of the claim because the elements
required intentional, "willful" conduct and limited that conduct to "destruc-
tion" of evidence, leaving negligent conduct and "interference" out of the
equation. Therefore, the interference is with the plaintiffs case, not the evi-
dence; the evidence must be destroyed, not simply "interfered with."
Understanding the new claim was further hampered by lack of facts
to provide context. Without the facts of the district court case, readers could
not discern if the defendant had destroyed, concealed, altered or interfered
with the evidence, whatever shape the evidence had assumed in the case.
The Court supplied readers with a single legal authority, a New Jer-
sey intermediate appellate court opinion.2 °3 The New Jersey case, Viviano,
analyzed a tort claim for fraudulent concealment and its use when tortious
conduct occurred in a litigation context. 204 Thus, the Viviano court used the
elements of fraudulent concealment:
To prove that the defendants were liable to plaintiff for fraudulent
concealment, she had to show they were legally obligated to dis-
200. Id.
201. Spoliation has been used as a broad term encompassing both destruction and "significant and mean-
ingful alteration." Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 n.4 (N.J.Super. 1991) (citing Black's Law Dic-
tionary definition of spoliation).
202. Smith v. Howard Johnson, 615 N.E.2d at 1038.
203. Id.; See Viviano, 597 A.2d at 550
204. Viviano, 597 A.2d at 548-49 (acknowledging that New Jersey recognized a claim for the tort of
fraudulent concealment in State of N.J. Dep't. of Environ. Pro. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983)).
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close the ... memorandum to her; that it was material to her per-
sonal injury case, that she could not readily have learned of it
without their disclosing it, that they intentionally failed to disclose
it to her, and that she was harmed by relying on the nondisclo-
sure."205 Rather than recognizing a new spoliation tort, the Viviano
court adapted an existing claim, noting that the claim before it was
"analogous to a recently recognized cause of action for destruction
of evidence that has been dubbed 'spoliation of evidence."'
20 6
To support its analogy, the New Jersey court explained that the spoliation of
evidence tort "had its origin in California," citing the tort's elements from a
California intermediate appellate court opinion, an opinion not officially
published.207
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Smith was supported by a le-
gal house of cards. The court relied solely on the Viviano decision, a deci-
sion that did not recognize any spoliation of evidence torts.208 The elements
listed in Smith and credited to Viviano actually came from a California case
cited in Viviano, a case without precedential authority in California. Indeed,
California has since declined to adopt spoliation torts. 209 The Smith opinion
has left future litigants without facts or useful legal precedent to understand
the confusing and contradictory answer and elements that created a new
Ohio tort claim.
The opinion announced a claim labeled "interference with or destruc-
tion of evidence" but matched the label to elements limited to destruction of
evidence. Thus, Ohio courts have struggled to interpret Smith and apply it to
a range of factual settings. Because the Smith elements require destruction
of evidence, the destruction of evidence cases have been the easiest to de-
cide.210 But, when evidence is alleged not to be destroyed but altered or con-
cealed or withheld, the lower courts must re-write Smith to align the claim's
label with its elements. First, a lower court expanded the "destruction" ele-
205. Id. at 548.
206. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 550 (citing "County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal.App.3d 1232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), review
denied and ordered not to be officially published (Feb. 1, 1990).").
208. Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, 756-59 (N.J. 2001) (noting Viviano did not create a new tort
of intentional spoliation, but simply adapted the existing fraudulent concealment tort to the litigation context).
209. Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999) (holding no claim for third
party intentional spoliation and expressly declining to decide if cause of action of negligent spoliation exists);
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (holding no claim for first party inten-
tional spoliation).
210. Cechowski v. Goodwill Ind. of Akron, Ohio, No. 17944, 1997 WL 270523 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14,
1997) (office memoranda destroyed); Sheets v. Norfolk So. Corp., 671 N.E.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Ohio Ct. App.
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ment to include conduct where a party "willfully destroyed, altered or con-
cealed evidence., 21' The court, without offering any legal citation, an-
nounced that "[t]o establish her spoliation claim, appellant was required to
demonstrate the appellee willfully destroyed, altered, or concealed evi-
dence., 212 Then, the court relied on Smith's "interference" with evidence
label rather than the enumerated element of the claim, "willful destruction"
of evidence.213 To further support its reading, the Court relied upon the
meaning of the term "spoliation," as encompassing "significant and mean-
ingful alteration., 21 4 Spoliation can encompass such conduct, but the Smith
court did not use spoliation anywhere in its answer to the certified ques-
tion.215  The federal court question labeled the claim "spoliation of evi-
dence," but the Court's answer labeled the action as one for "interference
with or destruction of evidence.' ' 216 Another court declined to extend the
claim beyond its element of destruction of evidence: "[I]n this case, the
plaintiff neither alleged 'willful destruction' of the RV wash bottle by de-
fendant nor presented any evidence that defendant had willfully destroyed
the evidence .... ,,217
When the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the new claim a second
time, l8 it re-labeled it as a "spoliation of evidence" claim.219 The Court then
refined the element of destruction of evidence to now include concealment,
interference or misrepresentation, in accord with the lower court's interpreta-
220tion.
In addition to Ohio's lower courts, courts outside the state spent con-
siderable time deciphering Smith's terse ruling. By ignoring the question's
reference to "intentional" or "negligent" spoliation and substituting the
broader term "tort," Smith left courts concluding that Ohio recognized both
intentional and negligent spoliation claims.22' Such courts, looking for
1996) (dispatcher tapes destroyed).
211. Drawl v. Cornicelli, 706 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 852.
213. Id. (rejecting argument that Smith v. Howard Johnson elements limited action to destruction of evi-
dence).
214. Id.
215. Smith v. Howard Johnson, 615 N.E.2d at 1037.
216. Id.
217. Barker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 1661961, *7 (Ohio App. Ct. Dec. 31,2001).
218. Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ohio 2001).
219. Davis, 756 N.E.2d at 662 n.3 (Cook, J. dissenting) ("[Tihe Smith court did not apply the district
court's term 'spoliation' in its order answering this question, although the term has been apparently reborn in
today's syllabus.").
220. Id. at 489-90.
221. Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., 722 A.2d 1247, 1248 (Del. Super. 1998); Larson v. City of Trenton,
180 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D.N.J. 1998). Butsee Goffv. Ives Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 387, 388 (Ark. 2000) (Ohio
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precedent to inform their own views of this new tort, found the Smith court
recognized the new tort "without explanation., 222 Rather than spending eight
years trying to reconcile the inconsistencies in Smith, the Ohio Supreme
Court should instead issue answers to certified questions that develop the
legal analysis as fully as in any other opinion recognizing a new state law
cause of action. Nothing in Ohio's or in any other state's certification rule
limits the state's highest court from issuing full responses and opinions when
answering certified questions.223
The same year it issued Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
the tort of intentional interference with expectancy of inheritance in a deci-
sion answering a certified question.224 In this opinion, the concurrence pro-
vided a factual narrative,2 5 and the majority cited two legal authorities.226
But again, the precise label and meaning of the new tort was garbled from
the outset. The Court noted the Sixth Circuit's certified question uses the
language interference "with expectancy or inheritance., 2 7  In the parties'
briefing, some repeated the question's language, but other parties used the
phrase interference with "an expectancy of inheritance., 228 Rather than ex-
pressly rephrasing the question, the Court "assumed" that the different ver-
sions of the tort's name all meant precisely the same cause of action and fur-
ther "assumed" that the claim required "an expectancy of inheritance. 2
29
By equating phrases with distinct meanings, the Court sowed the
seeds of future ambiguity and argument. Four years later, a court of com-
mon pleas judge addressed the new claim of "tortious interference with an
expectancy of inheritance., 230 The judge, however, had to read the claim to
be one for both interference with an expectancy or interference with an in-
heritance. 23' The claim arose when a party interfered with a gift made
Supreme Court holding cause of action exists in tort intentional interference with evidence).
222. Goff, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
223. Indeed, other jurisdictions have recognized analogous destruction of evidence claims in response to
certified questions: Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 847 (D.D.C. 1998) (issuing eight-page
opinion with factual summary and legal analysis to answer question: "Under District of Columbia law, may a
plaintiff recover against a defendant who has negligently or recklessly destroyed or allowed to be destroyed
evidence that would have assisted the plaintiff in pursuing a claim against a third party?").
224. Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203.
225. Id. at 204 (Evans, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 203 (answering the question "in the affirmative ('yes')" and citing: "See, generally, Morton v.
Petit,177 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio 1931) ("We find particularly instructive Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979)
58, Section 774B ...
227. Id. at 203.
228. Id.
229. Id.




through a trust; therefore, the defendant interfered with the "expectancy" the
trust created.232 To reach its conclusion, the common pleas court provided
additional legal authority for its tort analysis.233
The Sixth Circuit, after receiving the answer to its certified ques-
tions, also needed to explain how the two related claims could be discovered
in the Ohio Supreme Court's four-paragraph opinion, which appeared to cre-
ate only one type of claim. 234 The district court, therefore, received addi-
tional guidance about the Ohio Supreme Court's answers, as well as addi-
tional research-analogous Florida, Maine, North Carolina and Georgia case
law.235
The task of researching and analyzing the history and use elsewhere
of a new tort claim belonged to the Ohio Supreme Court and remained with
it when it answered certified questions. Had the Court developed this analy-
sis, the task would not have been left to lower courts and the Sixth Circuit to
label the claim properly and match the claim to its elements. The certifica-
tion process permits the Ohio Supreme Court to recognize new state law
causes of action. Opinions issued in response to certified questions have no
restrictions that limit opinions in any way. The Court's tasks in establishing
a new state claim should be uniform in response to appeals with the state
system or in response to certified questions.
B. Ohio Case Study: Ohio Federal Courts' Certification Practices
Ohio's federal courts stand as gate-keepers on the other side of the
certification equation. Like the practices of the Ohio Supreme Court, the
Ohio federal certification study examines both the procedures and the merits
of the cases coming before Ohio federal district courts and the Sixth Circuit
on motions for certification.
1. Federal Court Procedural Certification Practices
Federal courts are the first to apply the Ohio Supreme Court's certi-
fication rule to decide a motion to certify or to certify a question sua
232. Id. at 370-71.
233. Id. at 371 (citing analogous Florida state law, analogous Tenth Circuit law, and Prosser & Keaton on
Torts).
234. Firestone, 25 F.3d at 325-27 (providing "additional guidance" to the district court after receiving





sponte. In addition to the Rule's stated requirements, Ohio federal courts
have developed a range of factors that influence the certification decision.
Further, these courts have addressed, with varying degrees of success, fed-
eral litigants' misuse of certification as a lateral appeal or the chance to shop
for a second, more favorable, forum in the Ohio Supreme Court.
The federal court's first task is to apply the Rule's stated require-
ments. In sending fifty-five federal cases to the Ohio Supreme Court, the
federal courts typically cited the Rule, quoted the Rule, and carefully applied
the Rule to the issue before them. 237  But there are some exceptions. The
Rule provides that the certified question of state law be one that may be de-
terminative of the proceeding, but in Brady v. Safety-Kleen, a federal district
court permitted a "lateral" appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court when it issued
a certification order. Although the federal court recited the Rule, its Order
also concluded that: "Section 4121.80 is constitutional in its entirety and that
federal diversity jurisdiction no longer exists in this case., 238 Thus, the fed-
eral court held the Ohio statute constitutional, then asked the Ohio Supreme
Court to answer the same question. The Ohio Supreme Court's answer could
not determine the outcome of the federal case, but it did provide the litigants
with a new forum to shop for a different result, which the Ohio Supreme
Court provided by "reversing" the federal court and holding the statute
unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, other Ohio federal courts have also chosen to certify
questions at or near the close of the proceedings before them, making it
likely there is little for the Ohio Supreme Court to determine. 239 This elev-
236. See supra Ohio certification rule's procedural requirements. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII (Indicat-
ing that the federal court acts first to certify or not, then the Ohio Supreme Court decides to accept or not.)
237. See, e.g., Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., Order Certifying Questions of State Law, No. C2-87-1548
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 1989) (citing Rule and finding questions may be determinative of the cause and no con-
trolling precedent); Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 984 F.2d 746, 747 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding no
controlling precedent, that appeal "turned on" the question, and citing Ohio's Supreme Court Rule of Practice
XVIII).
238. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp, Order Certifying Questions of State Law, No. C2-87-1548, at 8 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 20, 1989).
239. Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 783 (federal court ruled on motion to remand case to state court, but on mo-
tions to reconsider or certify, court certified questions, waited sixteen months for answer); Sorrell v. Thevenir,
633 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio 1994) (federal court tried case to jury verdict, certified after motion for a verdict
setoff, received answer over eleven months later); Clark v. Quality Stores, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio
1994) (federal court tried case to jury verdict, certified after motion for a verdict setoff, received answer over
eleven months later); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (federal court tried case to a jury verdict,
but did not enter judgment on verdict, certified to Ohio Supreme Court, received ruling twenty-two months
later); But see Schaeffer v. State Farm Mut., Order of Certification, No. 3:99CV7375 (N.D. Ohio April 13,
2001) (motion to certify granted early in proceedings during motion for judgment on the pleadings); Krejci v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., Order of Certification, No. 1:91CV1545 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 1992) (mo-
tion to certify granted early in proceedings during motion to dismiss).
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enth-hour decision to certify undermines or negates the federal court's own
efforts, affords the losing litigant an immediate appeal to state court, and
prolongs the litigation for the winning litigant. Ohio federal courts should
enforce the Rule's need for a question as yet to be determined and refuse
questions that have been determined or been determined, but for final entry
or motions to reconsider.
Federal courts outside Ohio have readily recognized that litigants
abuse the certification process by seeking a reversal in the state supreme
court after the federal court has ruled on or is close to ruling on the state law
question. When plaintiffs lost on summary judgment in the district court,
they "moved the district court to stay judgment and to certify the choice of
laws question" to the state supreme court.24° When the district court denied
the motion, the plaintiffs renewed it on appeal. 24' The appellate court denied
certification, noting the plaintiffs sought it only "after the motion for sum-
mary judgment had been decided against them., 242 Such a certification gives
the losing party the chance to "gamble" for a different outcome in state
court. 243 The decision to certify also serves to discard the federal court's
work, gives the losing party an immediate appeal, and prolongs the litigation
needlessly. 2" Thus, the Ohio requirement that a certified question should be
determinative of the issue acts to prevent this abuse. Ohio's federal courts
should enforce this requirement and decline to certify when a district court
decision effectively determines the issue, but the losing party attempts to
reverse the decision in the state court.
The Rule requires there be no controlling precedent from the Ohio
Supreme Court to answer the certified question. Ohio federal courts have
honored this requirement, yet remained alert to its potential for abuse. While
there may be no controlling Ohio Supreme Court precedent, Ohio state
courts and Ohio federal courts may have already addressed the state law is-
sue sufficiently so as to make certification unnecessary. As a Sixth Circuit
panel observed, "While there is no controlling Ohio Supreme Court prece-
240. Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co, Melrose Div., 823 F.2d 207, 208 (8th Cir. 1987).
241. Id. at 208-09.
242. Id. at 209-1O(emphasis added).
243. Id. at 210.
244. See, e.g., Complaint of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984) (certification after the district court
has decided an issue would wrongly permit a losing party a "second chance at victory"); Harris v. Karri-On
Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming denial of motion to certify that followed a completed
district court trial); Stefano v. Smith, 705 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Conn. 1989) (declining to certify when court
"has read the briefs, researched the issues, held oral argument and placed the case on the trial list. Certification




dent on the issue, certification to the Ohio Supreme Court is unnecessary
since the question has been squarely addressed by this circuit on several oc-
casions.,, 245 Further, the court recognized the motion to certify was a device
to gain a lateral appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court: "this appears to be an
attempt by [plaintiff-appellant] to appeal the decision of the district court, as
well as the Leaman decision in the Ohio courts. Such use of the certification
process is inappropriate., 246 One litigant, while moving to certify, cited con-
trolling precedent from Ohio Supreme Court. The district court denied the
motion, observing that, rather than meeting the Rule's element for no con-
trolling precedent, the litigant herself relied upon controlling precedent: "de-
fendant's arguments in this case are based on Scott-Pontzer, a recently-
decided and arguably controlling opinion issued by [the Ohio Supreme
Court]. 2 4 7
Thus, by honoring the Rule's requirements for a question that may be
determinative and a question not yet addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court,
federal courts have also furthered the policies underlying certification. The
Ohio federal courts have explicitly taught their litigants that certification is
not an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court to be used when a question of state
law has already nearly reached determination in federal court or when exist-
ing precedent in the Ohio Supreme Court or lower Ohio state courts makes
an unfavorable answer clear without certification.
The Ohio federal courts should also honor Ohio precedent for formu-
lating certified questions as pure questions of law. 248 Yet, the federal courts
have little incentive to struggle with phrasing questions of pure law because
the Ohio Supreme Court, while announcing the requirement, has expressly
applied it to certified questions arriving from federal court on a single occa-
sion.249 The questions federal courts certified in the fifty-four cases sent to
the Ohio Supreme Court largely fail to meet a pure question of law stan-
dard.250 Thus, federal courts are aided by the Ohio Supreme Court in largely
ignoring its decision to require pure questions of law.25'
The requirement should first be addressed in the federal courts. By
245. Herstrum v. Hodge, 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 452299 at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1997) (per curiam).
246. Id.
247. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Nocero, 2001 WL 1792448 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2001) at *11.
248. See supra discussion of question of law requirements as treated by Ohio Supreme Court.
249. Copper, 621 N.E,2d at 396 (declining to answer questions "that are so factually specific in nature.").
250. See Appendix D and discussion supra at 31-38.
251. Mfr's Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Road Comm., 587 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ohio 1992) ("As a state-
law questions certified by federal court, the issues before us are questions of law, not of fact. [T]the federal
court hears and decides the cause by applying the law, as we determine it, to the facts of the case.").
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explicitly raising the difficulty, the federal courts can open a dialogue with
the Ohio Supreme Court. The question of law requirement was engineered
to keep the two courts within their assigned certification roles. When the
requirement is ignored, it permits the Ohio Supreme Court to accept certified
questions of law applied to fact, to determine questions of fact, and to issue
holdings based on the facts. The federal courts may be glad to send these
law application and question of facts tasks elsewhere, but the policy underly-
ing the question of law requirement was to define narrowly the Ohio Su-
preme Court's role to declare the rule of law, not to apply it to the facts.
By its language, Ohio's Supreme Court Rule of Practice XVIII per-
mits the Ohio Supreme Court to answer questions certified by a "court of the
United States," specifically including federal magistrate judges.252 For the
past fourteen years, however, Ohio bankruptcy judges questioned, in pub-
lished opinions, whether bankruptcy courts could certify,2 3 heard one liti-
gant express certainty that bankruptcy courts could certify, 2 4 and certified
several questions to the Court, only to have them rejected without comment
as to their source. 255 A single bankruptcy court's three attempts to certify an
identical set of questions were all declined, but the Supreme Court's re-
sponse likely had little to do with the sources of the questions, but more with
their redundancy.256
Currently, Ohio's Supreme Court Rule of Practice XVIII and Ohio
252. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OHIO XVIII § 3 ("The certification order shall be signed by any justice or judge
presiding over the cause or by a magistrate judge presiding over the cause pursuant to 28 US.C. Section
636(c).") (emphasis added).
253. In re McCombe, 93 B.R. 597, 599 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting issue may recur and preferring to
certify, but concluding that certification "apparently may not be available to bankruptcy courts.") (issue later
reached Ohio Supreme Court on certified question from federal district court.), see Scott v. Bank One Trust,
577 N.E.2d at 1078.
254. In re Plus Gold, Inc., 1994 WL 92415, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 1994) (litigant, Ohio Dept. of
Taxation "notes that the court may certify the question to the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to Ohio Supreme
Court Rule XVI" but argues for submission to Board of Tax Appeals for resolution).
255. See e.g., In re Franz, 761 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2002) (declining to answer questions, Judge Patricia
Morgenstern-Claren, Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Ohio, certified while she noted in Certification
Order that the same issues had been certified in Hunter v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 759 N.E.2d 784
(Ohio 2001); In re Miller, 762 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio February 6, 2002) (declining to answer questions Judge
Patricia Morgenstern-Claren, Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Ohio, certified while she noted in Certi-
fication Order that the same issues had been certified in Hunter v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 759 N.E.2d
784 (Ohio 2001), and that the same issues had been sent for certification in In re Franz, 761 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio
2002), and that the the same issues had been sent for certification in Wojcik v. Option One Mtge. Corp., 762
N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2002)); Wojcik v. Option One Mtge. Corp., 762 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2002) (declining to
answer questions Judge Patricia Morgenstem-Claren, Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Ohio, certified
while she noted in Certification Order that the same issues had been sent in Hunter v. First Union Home Eq-
uity Bank, 759 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2001), and that the same issues had been sent for certification in In re Franz,
761 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2002)).
256. See id. for examples.
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Supreme Court precedent do not address expressly the power of bankruptcy
courts to certify, but those courts can be read to fall within the Rule's phrase
"a court of the United States." Recently, the Court has accepted and an-
swered a certified question from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth
Circuit.257 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that it will receive
bankruptcy questions in the future, at least from the Appellate Panel. Ac-
cepting certified questions from all bankruptcy courts would satisfy the
stated goals of certification by accepting determinative, unsettled question of
state law from courts that must regularly address substantive state law is-
sues.
258
Ohio's Supreme Court Rule of Practice XVIII uses the 1995 Act's
generic language of "a court of the United States," rather than a laundry list
of federal courts used in the 1967 Act. The 1995 Act also mentions bank-
ruptcy courts specifically. 259 The Ohio Rule could be read broadly as it is
stated: to accept questions from "courts of the United States," including trial
level bankruptcy courts. 260 The bankruptcy courts' need and desire for quick
resolution should contribute to existing federal restraint in certification.261
The 1988 Ohio Rule's phrase any "court of the United States" should
be read to include many more "specialty" courts, in addition to the bank-
ruptcy courts. The evolving versions of the Uniform Act moved from a list-
ing of specific federal courts to the generic phrase, "a court of the United
States" in order to eliminate the 1967 Act's long list: "the Supreme Court of
the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States
District Court." Through a 1990 amendment, the list grew to include: "the
United States Court of International Trade, the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation, the United States Court of Military Appeals and the United
States Tax Court." When the 1995 Act was issued, the long list was replaced
257. In re Stewart, 761 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio 2002) (Judge Patricia Morgenstern-Claren presiding); In re Stew-
art, 771 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ohio 2002) ("The certified question is answered in the affirmative.").
258. For example, both pending cases concern the constitutionality and the application of OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5301.234 (2002), an Ohio statute creating an irrebuttable presumption that a mortgage is properly
executed notwithstanding any defects in the witnessing or acknowledging of the instrument unless the mortga-
gor denies, under oath, signing the mortgage, or the mortgagor is unavailable, but there is other sworn evi-
dence of fraud.
259. UNIFORM QUESTION OF CERTIFICATION OF LAW ACT § 3, ct. (1995), 12 U.L.A. 73 (1996) (new lan-
guage, "a court of the United States" was intended to permit courts to accept question from "any United States
court including bankruptcy courts.") (emphasis added).
260. See, e.g., Alaska R. App. Pro. 407(a) ("The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it
by the Supreme Court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district
court, a United States bankruptcy court or United States bankruptcy appellate panel .. ") (emphasis added).
261. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 200 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) (declining to certify unsettled question
of state law because Nevada Supreme Court adjudication would require eighteen to twenty-four months).
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with the phrase, "a court of the United States," and the comment noted this
phrase included the courts previously listed, as well as bankruptcy courts,
which were not listed previously.
Jurisdictions adopting the Act often chose to specify the federal
courts they wished to act as certifying courts.262 Other jurisdictions kept the
1990 amendment's list of federal courts and thus have accepted certified
questions from such courts as the United States Tax Court.263 Nothing in any
legislative or rule history expressly indicates that Ohio adopted the Uniform
Act when it created the Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule on certification.
The Uniform Laws Annotated lists Ohio as an adopting jurisdiction, under
the 1967 Act, but with an extensive listing of the differences between the
Ohio Rule and the Act.264 A reading based on the history of the Uniform
Act, whether Ohio expressly embraced the Act or not, means that Ohio ac-
cepts certification from all federal courts, which would include federal
courts listed in the 1967 Act, the 1990 amended list, and 1995's addition of
bankruptcy courts. In practice, the federal courts certifying to the Ohio Su-
preme Court have been limited to those who sought to certify district courts,
courts of appeals, and now the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
By accepting the bankruptcy appellate panel's certified question, the Ohio
Supreme Court may have simply acted on Rule XVIII's invitation to all fed-
eral courts since 1988; the invitation was there, but no bankruptcy courts had
acted upon it until recently. Thus, the Tax Court, the Court of Claims, and
other federal courts have received Rule XVIII's invitation, but to date, ap-
parently have not needed to certify a question of Ohio state law.
Beyond the scope of Ohio's Supreme Court Rule of Practice XVIII's
express requirements, Ohio federal courts have developed additional factors
that influence the decision to certify. First, when questions are likely to re-
cur or are already present in several cases, Ohio's federal judges have tended
to grant certification when it affords a saving of judicial resources.265 Next,
262. Those states included Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
263. See, e.g., In re Cross, 891 P.2d 26, 26 (Wash. 1995) (answering certified question from the United
States Tax Court); Giant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 775 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont.
1988) (declining certified question from United States Tax Court because the issue presented would not de-
termine outcome of tax court litigation). But see Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771, 780 n. 19 (Fed.
Cl. 2000) ("Normally, we would prefer to certify such an important and undecided question directly to the
highest court of the state," but Missouri does not permit certified questions).
264. UNIFORM QUESTION OF CERTIFICATION OF LAW ACT General Statutory Note 84 (amended 1995)
265. See, e.g., Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1579971 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2001) at *1
(quoting Rule and concluding: "Furthermore, it appears likely that the certified questions are likely to arise in
other actions brought in both Ohio state and federal courts."); Delli Bovi v. Pacific Indemnity Co., Order of
Certification, No. 4:97CV0094 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 1997) (noting question to be certified is present in a total
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state law questions that have or will generate conflicting federal court views
make certification more likely.266 Further, federal courts in Ohio have bor-
rowed from state appellate procedure for discretionary appeals by favoring
questions that present issues "of great public and general interest ' 267 and
questions seeking answers that are "of importance to the citizens of Ohio.
268
Finally, Ohio federal courts favor restraint by requiring more for certifica-
tion than a federal court's difficulty in understanding state law. "The mere
difficulty of ascertaining local law provides an insufficient basis for certifi-
cation., 69 Sister federal courts employ similar factors of restraint to inform
their response to a request to certify.270
These additional policy factors demonstrate federal court respect for
the Ohio Supreme Court. Rather than certifying every question where an
answer may be determinative and there is no controlling precedent, Ohio
federal courts have sought to limit, rather than expand, the already broad
scope of certified questions. 271 The effort recognizes that the Ohio Supreme
Court should not be burdened with every state law question meeting the
Rule's low threshold. Federal policies favoring questions of general con-
cern, questions likely to recur, and questions already generating authority
splits respect the Ohio Supreme Court's resources. Ohio federal courts
should continue to employ these and other certification policies of re-
of seven cases pending in the district arising from the same accident); Sorrell v. Thevenir, Order of Certifica-
tion, No. 91-7704 (N.D. Ohio May 20, 1993) (certifying the question results in "conservation of judicial re-
sources").
266. See, e.g., Poe v. Trumbull Cty, Order of Certification, No 4:CV0180 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 8, 1997) (certify-
ing and noting a "likelihood of multiple and possibly conflicting federal court rulings on these state law ques-
tions.").
267. Gregory v. Dold, Order of Certification, No. 88-2043 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1988) (echoing Ohio Rule
of Practice III (B) (2) that governs discretionary appellate jurisdiction if the "case is of public or great general
interest").
268. Rolf v. TriState Motor Transit Co., Order of Certification, No. 3:99CV7687 (N.D. Ohio July 13,
2000); Platte v. Ford Motor Co., Order of Certification, No. 3:00CV7171 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2000).
269. Duryee v. United States Dep't. ofTrcasury, 6 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
270. See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining
questions that "may never recur and lack broad, general significance"); Barnes v. Atd. & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of
America, 514 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1975) (certifying because "repetitive contract interpretations" have a
recurring "nature involving literally hundreds of contracts with many public policy factors affecting the wel-
fare of local citizens" and thus should be resolved by highest state court). See also GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note
18, at 35 (Twenty-nine responses from federal judges surveyed about factors that cause them to decide to
certify a question and corresponding state judge survey showing preference to accept questions of "great
public importance" even when certification rule does not require it). For more examples of the factors used in
deciding to certify a question, see generally Rowson v. Kawaski Heavy Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (N.D.
Iowa 1994) (listing criteria federal courts should apply in deciding to certify questions).
271. The United States Supreme Court and legal commentators encourage more certification by describing
the decision to certify as needing only unsettled questions of law and returning issues to lower federal courts





Federal court restraint in granting certification directly affects the
Ohio Supreme Court's workload and future workload. Certified questions
are presently a very small portion of the Ohio Supreme Court's workload.273
Yet, the potential for certified questions is nearly limitless because the Rule
invites every federal judge in Ohio and in the rest of the country to certify
determinative, unsettled questions of Ohio state law to the Ohio Supreme
Court.
Fortunately, few have accepted the invitation, with the majority of
certified questions coming from federal district courts within Ohio. While
the Court may decline certification, declining requires time and energy in
itself. Certification advocates dismiss fears of "inundation," because of fed-
eral judge self-imposed restraint, yet the potential for large numbers of certi-
fied questions remains.274
While most Ohio federal court judges have never certified a question
to the Ohio Supreme Court, some have a high referral rate. 275 The Ohio fed-
eral courts should continue to practice restraint and to develop further poli-
cies that promote consistent, reasoned certification decisions.276
2. Federal Certification: Exercising Restraint by Explicitly Addressing Fo-
rum Shopping
Although not part of the Rule or existing precedent, Ohio federal
courts should consider the parties' possible forum shopping motives when
deciding whether to certify. The Erie decision was motivated, in part, by a
desire to prevent litigants from shopping for favorable law between federal
and state courts. If federal courts developed their own federal common law,
272. Other non-Rule certification policies of restraint include the forum shopping considerations described
infra at pages 46-50.
273. See Appendix B.
274. Barnes, 514 F.2d 704, 705 n. 4 ([W]e use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying."),
cited in Jerome A. Braun, A Certification Rule for California, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 935, 943 n.45 (1996).
See also Georgetown Univ. v. Sportec Int'l Inc., 572 A.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (excluding federal district
courts from certification; the limitation "was suggested as a method of achieving the goals of certification
'without unduly burdening the [court receiving certified questions.]"').
275. Appendix D. One Ohio district court judge sent sixteen out of the total fifty-five certified question
cases, or twenty-nine percent ofall questions certified during the Rule's fourteen year tenure.
276. The issues of federal court restraint in certifying and the fear that certified questions will inundate
state supreme courts are addressed in most certification literature. See, e.g., Bassler & Potenza, supra note 14,
at 514 ("That the certification floodgates have not opened as feared can also be attributed to the self-restraint
exercised by the federal judiciary with respect to the certification process."); GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at
44 (survey responses from federal judges who reported certifying questions "sparingly" and only those involv-
ing "important state court issues").
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rather than employing state law, the incentive to forum shop would be
heightened. The state law certification process, however, creates an "excep-
tion" to Erie: state law governs, but the parties may shop between state and
federal court for a speedier, less expensive or more favorable interpretation
of state law between state and federal court.
Certification forum shopping considerations appear in at least two
forms. First, a diversity plaintiff may file in federal district court, not to
receive the court's ruling, but to move promptly to certify to the highest state
court, avoiding the state court appeals process. Second, a defendant may
receive or anticipate an unfavorable ruling in state court, foresee a long state
appeals process, and seek removal to federal court. Once in federal court,
the defendant moves to certify to the highest state court. Ohio federal courts
have rarely considered certification's forum shopping potential.
a. Forum Shopping: Addressing the "Leapfrogging" Diversity Plaintiff
A Sixth Circuit dissenter acknowledged and rejected a diversity
plaintiff's attempt to forum shop using state law certification. The judge
observed: "It was plaintiffs themselves who pursued relief against defendant
Eli Lilly & Co. in the federal district court and not in the Ohio state
courts. ' 77 Because the plaintiffs chose to rely on the federal courts to de-
cide a state law issue present when they filed, the judge dissented from the
grant of certification to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Apart from this dissenter, Ohio federal courts have not considered
plaintiff diversity forum shopping, 78 even when litigants use certification
motions expressly for that purpose. 9  When diversity plaintiffs file in fed-
eral court to use certification to avoid the state appeals process, the federal
court should at least consider this factor as part of its certification decision.
277. Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., Order Certifying Questions of Law to the Ohio Supreme Court, No. 91-
3718 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 1992 at 1) (Wellford, J., dissenting). Compare Coleman v. Sandoz Pharmacy, Docket
No. 3:91CV7535 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 1995) (diversity case filed in federal district court; defendant moves to
certify; certification granted); question answered in 600 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 1998); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly &
Co., Docket No. 1:97CV1283 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 1997) (same); considered in, 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998),
reconsideration denied by, 698 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 1998); Rice v. Certain Teed Corp., Docket No. 3:97-CV-
7484 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 1997) (same).
278. Clark v. Quality Stores, Inc., Docket No. 93-1041(N.D. Ohio May 20, 1993) (plaintiff filed in federal
district court, then moved to certify; certification granted without comment on plaintiff's status as plaintiff in
diversity claim).
279. See Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ohio 2001) (plaintiff filed diversity
claim in federal district court, filed motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, certification to the
Ohio Supreme Court); Feature Story, 5 OHIo LAWYERS WEEKLY, Dec. 24, 2001, at B7 (attorney "brought the
challenge in federal court because he knew that, through the certification process, he could skip the drawn-out
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Further, the court should consider those cases already within the state appel-
late system that will bring the same issues to the Ohio Supreme Court on a
complete and developed record. When the federal district court certified the
question of the constitutionality of portions of Ohio's workers compensation
statute, cases within the Ohio state court system were also bringing similar
issues to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Holeton certification order was first
issued in late January 2000, when the Ohio Court of Appeals for Sixth Dis-
trict had already accepted an appeal on similar issues and would issue its
ruling in mid-March 2000.280 By August 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court al-
lowed an appeal from the Sixth District decision, 281 and another would soon
arrive from the Ninth District.282
The federal judge likely knew, and the plaintiffs attorneys in Hole-
ton did know, that the issues concerning the Ohio statute's constitutionality
would soon reach the Ohio Supreme Court.2 83 The decision to certify should
have considered the plaintiffs forum shopping as one factor, not a disposi-
tive one, but one factor. Further, the federal court should have acknowl-
edged and considered the progress of similar issues through the state appel-
late system. In a similar race to the state supreme court in a sister jurisdic-
tion, after a certified question reached the state supreme court, an appeal on
a similar issue reached the court through the state appellate system. The
state supreme court declined to rule on the certified question case, preferring
to rule on the case from the state system, which arrived with a developed
factual record and lower court opinions. 284 The Ohio federal courts should
similarly consider the benefits of deciding an issue framed by two lower
court opinions and a developed factual record when deciding certification
motions. At least one Ohio federal judge has noted this concern: "The leap-
frogging opportunity deprives the Ohio Supreme Court of that which all
judges like to have when confronted with an issue of first impression: that
somebody else has been first to offer an opinion. 2 85 At a minimum, the fed-
appeals process he would have faced if it were brought in a state trial court.").
280. Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 2000 WL 33356837 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2000) (amending certifica-
tion order originally issued Jan. 31, 2000, involving a state find); Yoh v. Schlachter, 2000 WL 281748 (Ohio
App. Mar. 17, 2000) (involving a self-insured employer).
281. Yoh v. Schlachter, 734 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio Aug. 30, 2000) (allowing discretionary appeal, but staying
for decision in Holeton).
282. In re Estate of Stewart, 2000 WL 840512 (Ohio App. June 28, 2000), appeal allowed, 749 N.E.2d 748
(Ohio 2001) (stayed and then decided per Holeton).
283. The same attorney represented the plaintiffs in Holeton and in Yoh. Feature Story, 5 OHIO LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Dec. 24, 2001, at B7 (" Yoh v. Schlacter, which was my ease out of the Sixth District Court of Ap-
peals that involved a self-insured employer.").
284. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Randall, 441 So. 2d 560, 560 (Miss. 1983).
285. News Story, OHIO LAWYERS WEEKLY; Dec. 3,2001, at 1209.
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eral courts could ask parties to identify the progress of cases in the Ohio
court system that raise similar issues.
In other jurisdictions, judges more consistently weigh the plaintiff's
choice of forum in deciding a plaintiff's certification motion. The plaintiff's
choice of forum is not determinative of certification, but may weigh against
certification in the decision process.286 By permitting, without consideration
or comment, this forum shopping, the Ohio federal courts disagree with
other federal circuit and district court judges who indicated "some weight"
should be given to forum shopping concerns.287 Ohio federal courts have not
developed this factor, but their silence may grow from several causes. Dis-
trict court judges may simply grant or deny certification motions from diver-
sity plaintiffs for other reasons. Judges may see strong reasons favoring cer-
tification and grant the diversity plaintiffs motion to certify without com-
ment on that party's decision to file in federal court. Or, there may be some
interest in having a thorny state law issue likely to require much research
and analysis depart the federal court's docket to be determined elsewhere.
b. Forum Shopping: Addressing the Removing, then Returning, Defendant
The second forum shopping consideration in certification is the re-
moving defendant. In nine of the fifty-five certification cases, the defendant
21had removed the case from state court. 88 As with the diversity plaintiff
286. Jorgensen v. Larsen, 930 F.2d 922, 1991 WL 55457 at * 3 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) ("We de-
cline to certify this question .... Plaintiffchose this forum to litigate and could have achieved her desire for a
state court ruling had she filed this action in the appropriate state court."); Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking &
Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 8 (1 st Cir. 1988) ("We find Fischer's request for certification particularly inappropriate
here. As plaintiff, he had knowledge of the state of the law under his theories of recovery, and had the choice
of forums to file suit, either in the local courts or the federal court under diversity jurisdiction."); Seaboard
Sur. Co. v. Garrison, Webb & Stanaland, P.A., 823 F.2d 434, 438 (11 th Cir. 1987) ("This is a diversity suit
which could have been brought in state court had Seaboard Surety wanted to get a state decision on whether to
expand existing law. Having sought a federal forum, Seaboard Surety must abide by a federal determination
as to the present state of Florida law.").
287. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 50. Forty-nine percent of circuit judges and forty-eight percent of
district court judges believe some weight should be given to forum shopping concerns. Fifty-two percent of
state court justices believe this factor should be given little or no weight.
288. Schaffer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 748 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 2001) (originally filed in Erie County
Court of Common Pleas and removed); Platte v. Ford Motor Co., 738 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio 2000) (originally filed
in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas and removed); Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 338
(Ohio 2000) (originally filed in Summit County Court of Common Pleas and removed); MetroHealth v. Hoff-
man-LaRoche, 670 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1997) (originally filed in Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
and removed); Corwin v. Ford Motor Co., 633 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1999) (originally filed in Erie County Court
of Common Pleas and removed); Henderson v. Lincoln Nat'l Speciality Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 1994)
(originally filed in Lucas County and removed); Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio
1993) (originally filed in Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and removed); Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 598 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992) (originally filed in an Ohio court of common pleas and re-
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movant, Ohio federal courts have not often weighed the defendant's decision
to remove, then seek certification, as a factor in the certification decision.
One Ohio federal court did address the issue of removal and certification, but
found no forum shopping. The defendant had removed the case to federal
court, where the plaintiff sought and received a return to state court through
certification. 289 But the plaintiff failed to file the proper briefs in the Ohio
Supreme Court and the Court dismissed for failure to prosecute.29 ° When the
case returned to the Sixth Circuit, the court found the plaintiffs failure to
file was not forum shopping. The plaintiffs inaction was not "a deliberate
attempt to avoid having the state court decide the dispositive question of
law" because the plaintiff had originally sought state court when it filed its




Again, sister federal jurisdictions address and weigh removal from
state court, followed by defendant's motion to return to state court as a pos-
sible tactic adding cost and delay to the plaintiff, who had chosen state court
in the first instance. 92 Ohio federal courts should adopt this consideration to
weigh as one factor among others in the decision to certify.
3. Ohio Federal Courts Should Respect Answers Given to Certified Ques-
tions
Once a federal court receives an answer from the Ohio Supreme
Court on an issue of state law, comity and other policies supporting certifica-
tion mandate that the federal court follow the law provided to it at its own
request.293 Ohio federal courts generally recognize, appreciate, and enforce
moved).
289. Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of North America, 984 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1993).
290. Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of North America, 598 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992).
291. Diamond Club, 984 F.2d at 748
292. Nat'l Bank of Washington v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Certification would be
inappropriate here, however, because Pearson himself removed this case from Maryland state court after the
Maryland judge decided the question against him. If Pearson wanted the Maryland Court of Appeals to rule
on the matter, he should not have removed the action to federal court."); Amer. Law Inst., Study of the Divi-
sion of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 296 (Official Draft 1969) ("[T]he courts should also be
especially reluctant to certify at the instance of a defendant who has removed a case to federal court. It is
ordinarily undesirable to allow a defendant a federal determination of facts and a state determination of state
law at the cost of delay to a plaintiff who was content to have the whole case promptly determined in the state
courts.").
293. Unfortunately, federal courts did not always adopt this practice. In early certification practice, answers
to certified questions were "merely advisory and entitled, like dicta, to be given persuasive but not binding
effect as precedent." Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1963). But see Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1968) ([C]ertification "gives a clear, positive, final
decisive answer. . . it is what the law actually is on the precise point presented to us and certified for answer.
It is Florida law binding on us as we perform our Erie role.").
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the state law rendered for them by the Ohio Supreme Court: "The Court is
deeply appreciative that the State of Ohio provides this certification proce-
dure.,
294
Yet, one Ohio federal district court, having received a divided opin-
ion from the Ohio Supreme Court, chose to dismiss the disputed state law
claim without prejudice, anticipating that the Court could change its mind in
the future.29 5 The Sixth Circuit found the district court disregarded the an-
swer it received after sending the question to the Ohio Supreme Court on a
"determinative" state law issue. 296 Having placed a "substantial burden" on
the state court, representing that "its answer would be dispositive," the dis-
trict court, therefore, "was bound to follow state law as declared in the an-
swer . . . "29' The binding effect of the Ohio Supreme Court's answers to
certified questions permits the Court to issue binding precedent, rather than
prohibited advisory opinions.298
Ohio federal courts, like those in other jurisdictions, have otherwise
heeded the binding effect of answers to certified questions. 299 The Ohio fed-
eral courts should continue to recognize their duty to "maintain the integrity"
of the certification process by accepting the Ohio Supreme Court's answers
as binding precedent. 3 00 It can hardly be credible to cite the need for comity
and respect for state courts furthered by certifying, only to disregard the an-
swer the state court provides.
4. Federal Courts Should Adopt Local Rules to Administer Certification
To make the state law certification process in federal court as effi-
cient as possible, some federal courts have created local rules and internal
operating procedures. The rules are brief, but include provisions to stay the
federal proceedings, to ensure that judges receive copies of the state supreme
court opinions when issued, as well as schedules for parties to file "a state-
294. Mfr. Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Road Comm'n, 963 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1992).
295. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[Gliven the status of Ohio law as mani-
fested in the majority and dissenting opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, plaintiffs should not be precluded
from availing themselves of other procedural alternatives.") (quoting district court decisions).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 719.
298. Id. (citing Travis v. P.U.C.O., 175 N.E. 586 (Ohio 1930) (prohibiting advisory opinions))
299. See, e.g., Longway v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 24 F.3d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1994); Sifer v. Gen.
Marine Catering Co., 892 F.2d 386, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Ordinarily a state court's answer to a certified
question is final and binding..."); Thompson v. Ramirez, 597 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.P.R. 1984) ([F]inding
state court answer to certified question "final and binding on the parties as to the issue of state law, to be given
full res judicata effect by the federal court.").
300. Grover, 33 F.3d at 719.
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ment of position" in light of the state court's decision.3 °' Other rules address
more substantive issues, requiring the court to make a written finding that
"certification of the issue will not cause undue delay or prejudice" and re-
quiring the court to "approve an agreed statement of facts" to transmit to
state court.30 2
Although these federal housekeeping matters seem obvious, the local
rules help ensure that the federal and state courts communicate with each
other and also internally about certification cases. Experience suggests that
similar rules would benefit Ohio's federal courts in certification matters.30 3
For example, when parties settled a case that was pending on certified ques-
tions in the Ohio Supreme Court, they informed the federal magistrate, but
not the Court. The federal magistrate failed to notify the Court immediately
because he "had assumed the parties would have advised the [Ohio Supreme
Court] that the order of reference was moot due to the fact that the parties
had settled . . . .,30 When two courts with crowded dockets are sharing
cases, simple procedures set in place by the referring court would improve
communication and avoid delay. At least one Ohio federal judge currently
provides notice to counsel of their obligations to the Ohio Supreme Court
once certification has been granted.3 5
The Sixth Circuit and its sister circuits may benefit from changes to
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure now being discussed. The Rules
Committee is considering, among other issues, the "desirability of a uniform
rule for referral of issues to state courts where authorized by state law and, if
the state court should resolve the issue, uniform rules for commenting on the
state court resolution.. . . ,306 These possible uniform federal appellate rules
for the certification process, as well as rules for the other federal courts certi-
fying questions, would improve the process and avoid unnecessary friction
301. See, e.g., U.S. Ct. of App. 2d Cir. § 0.27 (West 2003) (staying federal proceedings pending state court
decision); U.S. Ct. of App. 3d Cir. Rule 110.1 (West 2003) (staying federal case to "await state court's deci-
sion"); U.S. Ct. of App. 3d Cir., App. I. IOP 10.9 (West 1995) (notifying other judges when certifying ques-
tion and circulating response when received); U.S. Ct. of App. 7th Cir. Rule 52 (West 2003) (staying federal
case; parties response to state court ruling due twenty-one days after opinion issued); U.S. Ct. of App. 10th
Cir. Rule 12.7(2) (West 2003) (staying case to await state court's decision).
302. E.D. Mich., Local Rule 83.40(3).
303. Presently the Sixth Circuit and Ohio district courts have not promulgated any rules addressing state
law question certification.
304. Culp v. Toledo, No. 90-1470 Notice of Withdrawal of Certification (May 13, 1991); Culp v. Toledo,
573 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio 1991) (noting federal court has learned of settlement and withdrawn order of reference).
305. Watkins v. Transcontintental Ins. Co., Notice to Counsel of Record, No. 3:01-1934 (N.D. Ohio 2001)
(order issued by Judge Carr).
306. Call for Comments on Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure sent to Council of Appellate Law-
yers/Appellate Judges Conference (July 17, 2002).
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between the two court systems. In the absence of an amended Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure, the Sixth Circuit and the Ohio district court could
promulgate local rules for certification practice.
C. Testing the Presumed Benefits of Certification in Ohio State and
Federal Practices
State law certification in Ohio and elsewhere has been deemed supe-
rior to federal court decisions on unresolved issues of state law. Certifica-
tion is viewed as superior, in part, because federal judges must predict what
the Ohio Supreme Court would decide on the issue. Such prediction has
been labeled a particularly risky and speculative means of developing the
law. And, simply put, the federal judges' predictions demonstrate this risk
because they have wrongly predicted state law. Certification eliminates this
hazard. Further, certification also directs state law questions to those most
expert in state law, the Ohio Supreme Court justices. The Court's experi-
ence and expertise makes them superior in matters of state law compared to
judges sitting on Ohio's federal courts. Certification is also presumed to
generate definitive Ohio law more quickly because it is speedier than the
alternatives of Pullman abstention or progressing through state appellate
processes. During Ohio's fourteen years of certification practice, these pre-
sumptions have proven to be only partially true.
1. Presumed Benefit: Certification Avoids Federal Judges' Inaccurate Erie
Predictions of State Law
Certification advocates argue that certification resolves the "predic-
tion problem." The prediction problem arises because federal judges are
called upon to predict or offer an "Erie guess" of how the state's highest
court would rule on an unresolved issue of state law.3 °7 Certification pro-
tects the federal judge from "time-consuming speculation" and the "possibil-
ity of embarrassing error., 30 8 These federal court decisions are also "unreli-
able" because a state court could later decide the same issue differently;
thus, citizens cannot rely on the federal court prediction in conducting their
307. Allen Chase, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions: Are Inferences Permitted?, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 407, 408 n.4 (1992).
308. Braun, supra note 274, at 935 (citing Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1994)).
See also Note, Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 465, 467 (1969).
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affairs. 30 9 The Ohio Supreme Court has fully embraced this fear of federal
court prediction and guesswork.310
Ohio federal courts have echoed the dangers of prediction when
granting motions to certify to the Ohio Supreme Court. By deciding a state
law question itself, a federal court noted "essentially this option [to decide
the question of state law] requires federal courts to take an educated guess at
how the state supreme court would decide a matter of state law" and worried
that such federal "prognostications" may later be proven inaccurate.311 Sister
federal courts similarly express concerns, deeming prediction "so hazardous"
it becomes more like "prophecy.,
312
The "evils" of prediction in the judicial process, however, are hardly
limited to federal courts determining unsettled questions of state law. Ohio
state appellate courts must similarly predict how the Ohio Supreme Court
will ultimately resolve and unsettled issue of state law. Indeed, Ohio's ap-
pellate courts reach different conclusions in their predictions so regularly
that the state provides a mechanism to certify these conflicting "predictions"
to the Ohio Supreme Court.313 Further, state courts must also predict unset-
tled questions of federal law; their predictions may later become inaccurate
when the federal courts settle the federal law question definitively.314
The same splits and predictions also occur regularly inside the fed-
eral court system; hence, an on-going feature in U.S. Law Week is devoted
to reporting and updating splits among the Federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal.315 Every federal circuit court has predicted how the United States Su-
preme Court would rule on an issue; they have come to different conclu-
sions. Further, United States Supreme Court opinions foreshadow future
decisions; readers must discern the foreshadowing to predict the high court's
future decisions. Thus, prediction as a process for developing the law is nei-
ther unusual, risky, nor speculative. Rather, it is a long recognized part of
the job for both state and federal courts.
The job of prediction, however, may become more difficult when a
309. Id.; See also Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1989) (predicting is a "hazardous
and unsatisfactory method of deciding litigation").
310. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080.
311. Krejci v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., Certification Order, Docket No. 1:91CV1545 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 28, 1992), at 4.
312. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 (citing Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392,393 (1Oth Cir. 1974)).
313. See Appendix B.
314. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (validating "reasonable, good-faith interpre-
tations of existing [federal] precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions").
315. See generally U.S. Law Week, which often contains the column Circuit Split Round Up.
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court predicts the decision of a court within another court system. Federal
courts, state courts, and certification advocates frequently cite errors federal
judges commit in predicting state law.316 Several compilations of federal
court errors in predicting state law appear in federal decisions 317 and com-
mentaries.31 8 Frequently, the flawed prediction case chosen for citation is
one involving sympathetic parties deprived of a remedy by a federal court, a
court that refused to certify the state law question. 31 9  The Ohio Supreme
Court has agreed that the danger of federal courts erring on issues of state
law "is scarcely theoretical. Federal courts acknowledge that they frequently
err in applying state law that is unclear or unsettled.,
320
Accurate federal court predictions of state law have not been com-
piled. Such a list of accurate predictions remains as anecdotal as the lists of
errors. Nevertheless, Ohio federal courts have made several accurate predic-
tions of state law; Ohio state courts have even relied upon these federal pre-
dictions when reaching their own decisions. Indeed, in answering a certified
question concerning market share liability in Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme
Court cited and quoted from an earlier Sixth Circuit prediction, finding its
analysis "unassailable., 321 Even when federal courts split in their views of
an Ohio state law issue, their discussion has helped state court analysis of the
state law issues.322 Thus, the benefit of prediction, rather than certification,
is a body of developed analysis for the Ohio state courts to employ in mak-
ing their decisions.323
316. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal judge wrongly predicted
Florida law in product liability claim; on rehearing, the federal court certified to the Florida Supreme Court,
which "reversed" the prediction.
317. See, e.g., U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-87 n.5-9 (5th Cir. 1964) (collecting cases
where state courts held federal courts erred in predicting state law); W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388
F.2d 257, 264-65 nn. 11-16 (10th Cir. 1967) (collecting cases) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
318. See Braun, supra note 274, at 937-40 (listing federal cases later found in error by state supreme court
decisions).
319. See id. at 938-39 (citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), a "particularly poignant
case," where plaintiff sued to recover a Monet painting stolen from her by Nazis, but she "never got her
Monet back because an available certification procedure was not used.").
320. Scott v. Bank One Trust, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 (citing lists and individual cases where federal court
predictions were "later rejected" by state supreme courts).
321. Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ohio 1998) (citing Kurzci v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113
F.3d 1426 (6thCir. 1997)).
322. Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 784-85 (citing to and noting split on issue developed within the federal courts
of Ohio). See also Sabin v. Ansorge, 2000 WL 1774141 (Ohio App. 1 th Dist. 2000) (quoting federal district
court's view of Ohio law in support of its own view of Ohio law); Edelman v. Franklin Iron & Metal Corp.,
622 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 1993) (agreeing with federal district court's criticism of Sixth Cir-
cuit opinion's interpretation of Ohio law).
323. Geri. J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305,
327, 334-43 (1994) (having the federal courts develop state law has positive normative effect and may con-
tribute to greater uniformity among the laws of the various states).
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Ohio federal court predictions have benefited Ohio state courts; they
have also benefited other Ohio federal courts.324 In a sister jurisdiction, a
federal district judge acknowledged that when another district court pre-
dicted a state law question, the prediction advanced analysis of the issue,
one still not resolved by the state supreme court: "[T]his court in making its
own prediction has the benefit of judicial criticism of the McIntyre court's
prediction. The decision has been decried by those courts that have dis-
cussed it."' 325 Four years of criticism of the earlier federal court prediction
informed the next federal court prediction on the unresolved issue of state
law.
Federal and state court judges work daily within hierarchies that re-
quire them to predict the decisions of the court of last resort within their sys-
tem. Prediction is part and parcel of judging in a lower court within an ap-
pellate system. 3 26 Lower courts in both systems predict, causing splits and
fragments until the highest court in the system speaks on the issue. Until the
highest court speaks, litigants may receive decisions that are later resolved
differently. Splits in both systems may linger on for years without resolu-
tion; both systems risk injury to parties and policy concerns by their inaccu-
rate predictions. Thus, federal court prediction of state law serves as only
one type of prediction causing the potential for such harm. 327 No definitive
numbers yet prove the rate of successful predictions within the same system
or across systems. Yet, along with the perceived harms of inaccurate predic-
tions, these predictions benefit judges within and across Ohio's court sys-
tems by developing interim thinking on the unresolved issues until they
reach the highest courts.
2. Presumed Benefit: Certification Uses the Experts and State Court Judges
to Decide State Law Questions
Even if prediction plays a part in any judicial system, state law certi-
fication advocates argue the process avoids the risk of federal court specula-
324. See, eg, Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (citing state
appellate court and federal district court opinions to inform analysis of Ohio employment discrimination
statute).
325. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947,952 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
326. How a Federal Court Determines State Law, supra note 19, at 1307 ("[T]he function of a federal
court in passing on a state issue is that of prediction concerning what the state supreme court would decide on
the same issue. This is, of course, the function of every court in an appellate hierarchy.").
327. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 ("By allocating rights and duties incorrectly, the federal court both does an




tion by placing important state issues in the hands of the "experts": the jus-
tices of the state's highest court.3 28 Federal judges are deemed to have less
state law expertise to decide state law issues than state court judges. Federal
judges, when facing an issue and predicting the state court's response, may
also render a "distorted adjudication" of state law issues by applying "fed-
eral jurisprudential assumptions. 3 9 In addition to these jurisprudential as-
sumptions, a federal judge, "an outsider" in state court, will have less ex-
perience interpreting and deciding state law issues than state court judges. 330
In matters of judicial expertise and experience, similar concerns have
been raised and researched concerning state judges' ability to decide federal
law issues. Scholars of federal judges conclude that federal judges' exper-
tise in federal issues derives from several related causes.3 31 One cause is
repetition: federal judges hear federal claims and issues daily while state
court judges address federal issues on a much less frequent basis.332 The
federal judges' ongoing exposure to federal issues provides them with a
well-developed knowledge of federal law that state court judges cannot at-
tain.333 Federal judge superiority has even been extended to a superior ex-
pertise in state law.334 Thus, some view federal judges as generally superior
and more familiar with substantive law including state substantive law. 335
Perhaps based on questions raised concerning parity, certification
proponents presume that the reverse is true: federal judges' ability to deter-
mine or predict accurately state law must be less than that of state court
judges, yet no research confirms this presumption. Certification advocates
would argue the idea of "reverse parity" does not exist because Ohio federal
judges lack the credentials, experience, and expertise to predict outcomes to
unsettled issues of Ohio law.
In reality, Ohio federal judges sometimes possess personal experi-
ence as state court judges similar to or greater than those sitting on the Ohio
Supreme Court. Twenty-nine Ohio federal district court judges have had the
328. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text.
329. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 70 F.3d 291, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J. dissent-
ing) ("States like New Jersey lacking certification procedures face the threat that federal courts will misana-
lyze the state's law, already open to varied interpretations, by inadvertently viewing it through the lens of their
own federal jurisprudential assumptions.").
330. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 (citations omitted).
331. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (1977).
332. See Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination
of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315, 1333 (1984).
333. Id.
334. Yonover, supra note 323, at 336-37.
335. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,434 (1992).
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opportunity to certify state law questions.336 Thirteen served within the Ohio
state court system before appointment to the federal bench.33 7 Among those
who served on the state bench, they served an average of eleven and one-half
years. Of the seven Ohio Supreme Court justices, six of them served as Ohio
judges before election to the Supreme Court, and among those six, they av-
erage nine years of service before appointment.338
At least one Ohio federal judge has noted federal judges' state law
expertise in the context of certification.339 When diversity plaintiffs lost a
decision in the district court, they appealed and sought to certify before the
Sixth Circuit. The dissenter observed that plaintiffs chose federal court to
bring claims that included an Ohio state statute of limitations question and
had been "unsuccessful before an experienced Ohio jurist," noting that "Dis-
trict Judge Rice had served for ten years as an Ohio state judge before as-
suming the federal bench in 1 980."0
40
Ohio certification practice indicates that federal district court judges
without service on the Ohio state bench, tend to account for the majority of
certified questions sent to the Ohio Supreme Court. Those judges without
state court experience sent seventy percent of the questions, while those with
state court judging experience accounted for thirty percent of the certified
questions.341 While federal judges without state judge experience may cer-
tify more readily, they are hardly incompetent to resolve state law issues
themselves. Indeed, they have the benefit of sitting with colleagues with
considerable state judging experience. Thus, federal district court judges are
in much better positions to predict state law than state court judges are to
predict federal law. State court judges cannot certify and, therefore, must
predict unsettled state law, and they must do so without the expertise of col-
leagues who are former federal court judges. No Ohio state judge has previ-
ously served as a federal judge, but several federal judges have served in
Ohio state courts.
Some federal judges in Ohio may feel less certain in making state
336. See Appendix E.
337. An Ohio federal judge's service as an Ohio state judge is the focus of this discussion. Ohio federal
judges may also have acquired knowledge of Ohio state law from their experiences practicing law in Ohio, but
that factor is not addressed here. See Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit
Court Deference to District Court Rulings, 73 MINN. L. REv. 899, 905 (1989) (examining federal district court
judges' experiences and expertise in state law).
338. See Appendix F.
339. Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., Order Certifying Questions of Law to the Ohio Supreme Court, No. 91-
3718 (6th Cir. March 6, 1992) (Wellford, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. See Appendices D & E.
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law predictions, but all have the advice and counsel of colleagues who have
considerable state judging expertise. The need for certification based on
their errors or incompetence in state law is overstated.
In addition, federal judges also enjoy certain benefits that may favor
having some state law questions resolved in federal court rather than certi-
fied to state court. Federal judges enjoy lifetime appointments, while most
state court judges face election and re-election. Thus, federal judges may
escape the political pressures their state counterparts experience and gain
more judicial independence. 342 Of the fifty-five cases certified to the Ohio
Supreme Court, a total of ninety-five individual questions were posed. Of
these ninety-five, sixteen raised state constitutional questions on several
statutes, as well as the constitutionality of Rule XVIII itself.343 While certi-
fication of state law questions, including state constitutional questions,
brings a definitive result, federal judges may bring a different benefit: the
ability "to make unpopular decisions regarding state constitutional rights.",
344
In at least one case, the federal court had held a controversial state statute
constitutional, but after certification, the Ohio Supreme Court struck it
down.345
Federal judges bring state court judging experience, state law exper-
tise, and judicial independence to issues of state law. Certification is an op-
tion open to federal judges, but one that incurs losses, as well as benefits in
adjudicating state law issues. State law expertise resides in both state and
federal courts. Federal courts should consider as a factor before presuming
that state court certification is required.
3. Presumed Benefit: Certification, an Alternative to Pullman Abstention,
Promotes Timely Resolution
Certifying state questions of law to state courts is presumed to pro-
vide the parties a definitive and a faster answer than the available alterna-
tives. Yet in practice, the hope of judicial economy is not often realized,
342. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 335-36 (1988) (suggesting
state courts favor the state in constitutional cases, while federal courts favor the individual bringing a constitu-
tional claim).
343. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079 ("Is Rule XVI [now XVIII] of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules of Procedure
constitutional under article IV, section 5 of the Ohio Constitution?").
344. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 1409, 1442 (1999).
345. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
346. See Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the
Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717, 731 (1969) (history of certification shows it is "neither plain, nor
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and even advocates concede certification can be a time-consuming method to
resolve an issue.347 In the Ohio study, time between federal court certifica-
tion and Ohio Supreme Court resolution averaged nearly twelve months.348
Certification's presumed benefit of efficiency, however, looms larger
when compared to Pullman abstention.349 "A principal reason for state certi-
fication statutes was the difficulty associated with so-called 'Pullman' ab-
stention cases in the federal courts., 350 Thus, even waiting a year for an an-
swer to a certified question answer pales when compared to the time elapsed
under abstention.
During certification's fourteen-year tenure in Ohio, the federal courts
received a dozen requests for Pullman abstentions.35' Of these requests, the
federal courts denied ten352 and granted two. 35 3 Thus, the Ohio certification
statute could have been employed twice in the past fourteen years to avoid a
Pullman abstention. Neither the parties nor the courts in these two cases
raised certification as a speedy alternative to a Pullman abstention, although
in both cases, certification had been available in Ohio for ten years. 354  In-
speedy, nor efficient"), David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 268, 317 (1969) (suggesting that judicial economy would support letting the federal court answer
the question themselves); Roth, supra note 19, at 2-3 ("Unfortunately, a flaw developed in the [certification]
process. The burgeoning caseload of the Supreme Court of Florida produced length delays in the certification
process. As a result, the Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to certify state law questions .... ").
347. See Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 291, 302-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that certi-
fication might not be a speedy process: "Moreover, neither the casinos nor Hakimoglu, with all their resources,
require immediate resolution of the matter."); In re Sullivan, 200 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) (declin-
ing to certify question because "eighteen to twenty-four months would be required before [the Nevada Su-
preme Court] could enter a decision if this matter were certified to it . .
348. Appendix G.
349. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496. Pullman is the relevant abstention doctrine; certification does not affect other
forms of abstention. See WRIGHT, supra note 21, at § 4248 (noting other forms of abstention remove a case
from federal court, rather than returning the case to federal court to have that court apply the state court's
decision of state law).
350. Western Helicopter, 811 P.2d at 632. See also Smith, supra note 60, at 656 n.43 ("certification is
preferable to the (albeit rare cases of diversity abstention.").
351. This number does not reflect unpublished orders, rulings from the bench and other rulings not appear-
ing on a database search of the "Sixth Circuit-all" for the terms Pullman and abstention.
352. Fifth Column, LLC v. Village of Valley View, 221 F.3d 1334 (6th Cir. 2000); Assoc. Gen'l Contrac-
tors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); Bennafield v. City of Canton Police Dep't., 856
F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Leis, 154 F. Supp.2d 1240 (S.D. Ohio 2001); F & G Ins. Underwriters, Inc.
v. Nocero, 2001 WL 1792448 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2001); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 135 F. Supp.2d 857 (S.D. Ohio 2001); J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. Brown, 40 F. Supp.2d 902 (N.D. Ohio
1999); Herbst v. Voinovich, 9 F. Supp.2d 828 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Summit County Crisis Pregnancy Ctr., Inc.
v. Fisher, 830 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ohio 1993); MacMillan v. City of Rocky River, 748 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D.
Ohio 1990).
353. Gottfried v. Medical Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998); Slyman v. City of Wil-
loughby, Ohio, 134 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1998).
354. In one case, a litigant moved to remove the case to state court "or, in the alternative, to certify state
law questions to the Ohio Supreme Court." F & G Ins. Underwriters, 2001 1792448, at * I. Reading the
intent behind the misguided motion to remove, the judge, sua sponte, raised, but then rejected, all forms of
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deed, certification has outgrown its roots in Pullman abstention and been
employed in much broader contexts.
Ohio certification movants seek to certify, but not as an alternative to
abstention. The fifty-five cases reaching the Ohio Supreme Court do not use
certification as the alternative to abstention. Thus, in terms of efficiency and
speedy resolution, abstention is really a straw person alternative. Ohio fed-
eral court prediction stands as the real alternative to certification. Without
any supporting data, certification opponents have argued federal court reso-
lution would be speedier than certification.355 Yet, if federal judges are
viewed as less expert in state law than the Ohio Supreme Court, their deci-
sions might be slow in coming.
Anecdotal evidence can be derived from three separate Ohio federal
court decisions made after the Ohio Supreme Court declined certification.
The Sixth Circuit certified a question to the Ohio Supreme Court on Febru-
ary 16, 1993; the Court declined to answer the question approximately nine
months later, on November 10, 1993.356 The Sixth Circuit resolved the ques-
tion and issued its opinion two months later.357 The Sixth Circuit certified
questions on August 26, 1996, but they returned unanswered on October 16,
1996.358 The Sixth Circuit ruled about a month later, on November 20,
1996. 3' 9 A district court judge certified questions on January 31, 1995; the
Ohio Supreme Court declined to answer over seven months later, on Sep-
tember 14, 1995.360  The federal judge ruled approximately four months
later. 36' The federal courts' comparative speed in ruling could be attributed
to federal court's knowledge that litigants have already waited for resolution
in the Ohio Supreme Court.
Efficiency remains an unsettled issue. Abstention places a case back
at the start of the state process, with a new judge and the need to "learn the
case" again. Certification places the case at the end of the state process, but
with new judges who must also learn the case. The court most familiar with
the case, the parties, the attorneys, and the unresolved question of law may
well be the federal court. Federal court prediction may be made by judges
abstention. Id. at * 10.
355. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part l, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 268,
317 (1969) (judicial economy would support letting the federal court answer the question themselves).
356. Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 16 F.3d 1218 (6thCir. 1994).
357. Id.
358. Fabens v. USAir, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1996).
359. Fabens v. USAir, Inc., 101 F.3d 702 (6thCir. 1996).




with or without previous state judging experience, but always with a famili-
arity of the case before them. Figures from the Ohio federal district courts
indicate that median times from civil case filing to disposition in the years
1996-2001, average 11.8 months in the Southern District and 4.78 months in
the Northern District.362
As these efforts at measurement indicate, it is difficult to compare
time spent in federal court resolving or predicting state law to time spent in
the Ohio State Court resolving state law issues by certification. What is
clear is that time expended because of abstention is not the proper measuring
stick.
IV. CONCLUSION
For fourteen years Ohio courts have practiced state law certification.
This record permits the Ohio federal courts and Ohio Supreme Court to see
the practice, not the promise, of certification. Rather than acting in reliance
on assumed benefits, these Ohio courts should act upon lessons learned from
Ohio's record to change and improve the process. Too often certification
analysis in Ohio opinions has been minimal, leaving little guidance for oth-
ers in the future.
In the fifty-five certification cases reaching the Ohio Supreme Court
from the federal courts, certification procedures received little attention or
discussion. Although the Ohio Rule represents but one variation of a form
of Uniform Act, and the practice is now embraced in forty-eight states, the
Ohio opinions rarely rely upon a sister jurisdiction's experiences to inform
their own certification practice.3 63 The few issues that have been articulated,
such as requiring "pure questions of law" and avoiding "fact specific" ques-
tions, are stated once, but not developed or applied thereafter.
Perhaps because the need to address certified questions is infrequent
enough, the Ohio Supreme Court seldom educates the federal system about
its view of the certification process. The Court does not consistently repro-
duce the questions it receives; it declines or dismisses without opinion and
may offer truncated opinions in answer to some questions. This record re-
362. Office of Human Resources and Statistics, Statistics Division, Table C-5, U.S. District Courts- Me-
dian Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposi-
tion, During the Twelve Month Period Ending March 31, 2002, (March 31, 2002) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2002/tables/c05mar02.pdf
363. A notable exception is Scott v. Bank One Trust, 577 N.E.2d at 1079-8 1, where the Court addressed its
ability to receive certified questions, federal courts' inaccurate predictions, and the constitutionality of Ohio's
Supreme Court Rule of Practice XVIII.
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flects answers given to fact-specific, but issue general questions; answers
given to questions already determined in federal court; and responses to
questions not even known to the reader.
Based on this record, the Ohio Supreme Court should resolve to in-
voke the Rule, precedent, and policy considerations consistently to deter-
mine when to make this unusual process available to federal litigants. The
Court should expressly use its own procedure, Rule XVIII, to frame its deci-
sions to dismiss, decline, or answer certified questions. Without the Rule,
the Court's discretion is left unrestricted; it could chose to certify based sim-
ply on its own desire to resolve an issue. The Court should include the text
of the certified questions in its opinion, no matter what its disposition.
While not technically required, an explanation of the Court's dismissal or
decision declining to answer will advance and improve future certification
practice. Lax attention to procedure and sparse explanations leave the Court
open to concerns that certified questions are declined or accepted arbitrarily.
Ohio federal courts should continue to employ the Rules' require-
ments and continue to develop the policy considerations of restraint they
have attached to certification. In addition, forum shopping should be added
to the list of factors that influence a certification decision. While the Ohio
Supreme Court may always decline certified questions, they must respond to
them in some way. Each federal court judge contemplating certification has
the duty to consider the relative sizes of the courts involved. Seven justices
sit on the Ohio Supreme Court. There are ninety-seven district courts na-
tionwide, with thousands of district court judges; there are thirteen federal
courts of appeals. By certifying, the federal judge will guarantee that the
Ohio Supreme Court justices take the time to respond by dismissing, declin-
ing, or answering.
Further, the federal court judges should consider their own resources
and the litigants' resources. A federal judge may seek advice from col-
leagues with state judging experience and may be able to resolve the state
law issue competently through these collaborative efforts. A federal judge
who certifies should consider that the litigants will, on the average, wait ten
months' for a response. Even after such a wait, the litigants may find them-
selves no closer to a decision because the questions were declined without
explanation.3 6
The United States Supreme Court and others have praised wide-
364. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cutcher, 654 N.E.2d 980 (Ohio 1995) (declining certified questions
without opinion).
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spread, liberal use of certification as a show of respect for state court comity
and respect for state court judges to determine their own state law. But, the
Ohio case study suggests that certification can be abused, like any other
process, and requires more vigilant and careful analysis by federal courts and
the Ohio Supreme Court. Certification should be neither encouraged nor
discouraged, but considered carefully and granted when its does serve the
purpose of comity, rather than to avoid the learning curve of unfamiliar state
law or to ease a crowded docket. Federal judges have resources-former
state judges-to help determine state law; a resource state judges lack. Fed-
eral certifying courts greatly outnumber the Ohio Supreme Court. Federal
courts have not offered state court judges a reciprocal sign of respect by of-
fering to accept certified questions from them. Thus, while certification is
premised on comity, in practice, other realities influence a decision to cer-
tify. Careful and limited, not broad, liberal use of certification reflects both
respect and comity for the Ohio Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX A: State Certification Statutes or Rules
Broadest: All highest state and Moderate: All federal courts Narrow: Omits federal district










































TENNESSEE [only TN dis-






of appeals, U.S. Supreme Court,
state supreme courts]
FLORIDA
[federal courts of appeals, U.S.
Supreme Court]
GEORGIA
[federal courts of appeals, U.S.
Supreme Court]
ILLINOIS
[7th Cir., U.S. Supreme Court]
LOUISIANA [federal courts of
appeals, U.S. Supreme Court]
MISSISSIPPI [federal courts of





[federal courts of appeals, U.S.
Supreme Court, state supreme
courts]
PENNSYLVANIA [federal




of appeals, U.S. Supreme Court,
state supreme courts]
* Arkansas and North Carolina have not adopted certification procedures.
** "international" = Canadian & Mexican courts
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APPENDIX B: The Supreme Court of Ohio's Annual Report; The
Ohio Courts Summary
Certified Conflicts * State Law CQ's Total Cases Filed
1988 39 3 2,216
1989 31 2 2,151
1990 32 5 2,462
1991 32 3 2,576
1992 22 5 2,646
1993 38 8 2,638
1994 31 1 2,769
1995 39 3 2,679
1996 46 3 2,888
1997 33 6 2,730
1998 84 5 2,728
1999 34 1 2,327
2000 37 4 2,355
* Conflicts between or among Ohio intermediate appellate courts may be certi-
fied to the Ohio Supreme Court under Ohio Supt. Ct. Prac. R. 4
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APPENDIX C: Responses To Certified Questions 7/1/88 - 12/31/01
DISMISSAL DECLINED IN WHOLE ANS. IN WHOLE OR PART
10 I W 10
Gregory v. Dold [upon joint
application to dismiss]
Culp v. Toledo [parties settled;
CQ w/drawn]
Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. [dis-
missed sua sponte, want of
prosecution]
Sun Refining (1994) [parties
settled; CQ withdrawn]
F & G v. Strayhorn [dismissed
sua sponte; text of CQ not in
dismissal order]
Roth v. Capital [dismissed sua
sponte; text of CQ's not in
dismissal order]
Tilley v. McMackin [Resp.'s
M/dismiss granted]
Baker v. Pease [notice of bank-
ruptcy, show cause order, dis-
missal]
Corwin v. Ford [dismissed sua
sponte; text of CQ not in dis-
missal order]
Broadview Savings ["inappro-
priate to intervene between
federal appellate & district
courts"]
Copper v. Buckeye [not appro-
priate- CQ's "so factually spe-
cific"]
Allstate v. Cutcher [declined to
answer; no opinion]
Fabens v. US Air [declined,
with text of 2 CQ's]
Comella v. St. Paul [declined;
no opinion, printed text of
CQ's]
Platte v. Ford [5 CQ's][op.=
text of CQ's & notes no pre-
liminary memos from parties]
Schaffer v. State Farm [2
CQ's][op. = text of CQ's]
Hunter v. First Union
[2CQ's][op. = text of CQ's]
Kemper v.Mich.Miller, de-
clined, then accepted
Watkins v. Trans. Cont'l [de-
clined; no opinion; printed text
of CQ's]
SSD Distrib. Sys. [I of 3]
Scott v. Bank One [2 of 2]
Morris v. Savoy [3 of 3]
Brady v. Safety Kleen [I of 1]
Grover v. Eli Lilly [I of I]
State Farm v. Rose [I of I]
Mfr. Natil v. Erie Cty. [2 of 2]
Taylor [1 of I] [yes; 2 cites]
Krejci[I of 1] [op.= no]
Burgess v. Eli Lilly [3 CQ's
resolved w/1 answer]
Smith[3 of 3] [10 lines;Icite]
Firestone v. Galbreath [2 of 2
Columbia Gas [1 of I]
Garlikov v. Contl [I of I]
Sun Refining (1993) [1 of 1]
Henderson v. Lincoln [1 of I]
Clark [6; 1 ans.others moot]
Colaluca [I of I]
Coleman v. Sandoz [3 of 3]
Beagle v. Warden [I of I]
MetroHealth [2 of 2]
Yepko [I of l][yes& I cite]
Sutowski [I of 1]
Genaro v. Central [I of I]
Cheek [lof 1][yes & lcite]
Poe v. Trumbull [CQ text, ans.
in negative, no op.]
Mullins [CQ text, no op.]
Perkins [1 of 1] [yes, 5 pp.]
Delli Bovi [2 of 2]
Rice v. Certain [I of 1]
Buckeye Union [2 of 3, 3d
resolve at trial level]
Laidlaw Waste [I of 1]
Linko v. Indemn. [3 of 4]
Holeton [8 of 8]
Funk v. Rent [3 of 3]
Rolfv. TriState [I of I]
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APPENDIX D: Sources of Certified Questions
N.D. OH N.D. OH E. DIV S.D.OH S.D. OH. E. SIXTH NON OH
W. DIV W. DIV. DIV. CIRCUIT DT. CT.
CARR BATCHELDER SPIEGEL KINNEARY e DDS E.D.
0 Gregory * Broadview S & * F & G 0 Scott v. Distrib.Sys PENN.
v. Dold L Ins. v. Bank One e Buckeye & Garlikov
C Gulp v. BELL Strayhorn e Smith v. Ho Union v.NE v. Contl
Toledo e Morris v. Savoy Jo Ins. Co.
* Tilley 9 Colaluca v. DLOTT * Baker v. D. IDAHO
v.McMackin Climaco e Mullins GRAHAM Pease * Roth v.
* Taylor v. e Beagle v. War- v. Rio * Brady v. e Mfrs. Natl Capital
Nat'l Group den Safety v. Erie
* Sun Ref'g * Holeton v. a Laidlaw v. e Burgess v. W.D.
(1993) Crouse Cons. Eli Lilly NEW
* Hender- LAMBROS 9 Copper v. YORK
son v. Lin- e Grover v. Eli Buckeye * Link v.
coin Nat'l. Lilly * Fabens v. Indemn.
* Clark v. DOWD US Air
Quality * State Farm v. * Firestone
* Corwin v. Rose v.
Ford 9 Columbia Gas Galbreath
0 Sun Ref'g Tran * Perkins v.
(1994) 9 Poe v. Trumbull Wilkinson
* Allstate v. C. * Diamond
Cutcher ALDRICH Club v. Ins.
e Rice a Krejci v. Prud. Co.
v.Certain Ins.
Teed e Sutowski v. Eli
* Rolfv. Lilly
Tri State NUGENT
* Platte v. * MetroHealth v.
Ford Hoffman-
* Hunter v. LaRoche
1st Union & Genaro v. Cen-
e Kemper v. tral
Mich. GWIN
* Watkins 9 Delli Bovi v.
v. Trans- Pac.
cont'l. Ins. O'MALLEY














APPENDIX E: District Court Judges for the Southern and Northern
Districts of Ohio
H. Weber W. Rice S. Dlott J. Kinneary J. Graham
Appointed 1985 Appointed 1980 Appointed 1996 Appointed 1966 Appointed 1989
3 yr. OH Appeals 9 yr. OH CCP
21 yr. OH CCP 2 yr. OH Muni
3 yr. OH Muni
S. Beckwith G. Smith [Sen- E.Sargus A. Marbley S.A. Spiegel
ior] [Senior]
Appointed 1994 Appointed 1987 Appointed 1996 Appointed 1997 Appointed 1980
2 yr. OH CCP 2 yr. OH CCP
7 yr. OH Muni 5 yr. OH Muni
J. Hoischuh J. Carr D. Dowd P. Economus P. Gaughan
[Senior] [Senior]
Appointed 1980 Appointed 1994 Appointed 1982 Appointed 1995 Appointed 1996
1 yr. OH Su- 13 yr. OH CCP
preme
5 yr. OH Appeals
J. Gwin J. Manos D. Katz P. Matia D. Nugent
[Senior]
Appointed 1997 Appointed 1976 Appointed 1994 Appointed 1991 Appointed 1995
8 yr. OH CCP 7 yr. OH Appeals 6 yr. OH CCP 2 yr. OH Appeals
6 yr. OH CCP 3 yr. OH CCP 8 yr. OH CCP
S. Oliver J. Potter D. Polster L. Wells K. O'Malley
[Senior]
Appointed 1994 Appointed 1983 Appointed 1998 Appointed 1983 Appointed 1994
13 yr. OH Ap- 11 yr. OH CCP
peals
A. Aldrich S. Bell
[Senior] [Senior]
Appointed 1980 Appointed 1982
5 yr. Muni Ct.
4 yr. CCP
5 yr. OH Appeals
2003]
228 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 29:2
APPENDIX F: Ohio Supreme Court Justices
D. Cook A. Douglas T. Moyer
Elected: 1995 Elected: 1985 Elected: 1986




APPENDIX G: Time Elapsed Certification to Resolution
Case name Time Elapsed:
Certification to
Resolution
I Gregory v. Dold, 551 N.E. 2d 1306 (Ohio 15 months
1990)
Broadview St L v. Riestenberg, 550 N.E. 2d 13 months
949 (Ohio 1990)
SSD Distrib. Sys. v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 539 5 / months
N.E. 2d 1121 (Ohio 1989)
Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E. 2d 24 months
1077 (Ohio 1991)
5. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E. 2d 765 (Ohio 1991) 22 months
6. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E. 2d 722 20 months
(Ohio 1991)
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E. 2d 969 25 months
(Ohio 1992)
8. Culp v. Toledo, 573 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio 1991) 10 months
9. Tilley v. McMackin 573 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 8 '/2 months1991)
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rose, 575 N.E. 9 ' months2d 459 (Ohio 1991)
Baker v. Pease Co., 641 N.E. 2d 201 (Ohio 8 months
1994)
Mfr.'s Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. 10 months
12. Comm., 587 N.E. 2d
819 (Ohio 1992)
13. Taylor v. Nat'l Grp. of Cos., Inc., 605 N.E. 2d 14 months45 (Ohio 1992)
Diamond Club v. Ins. Co. of No. America 598 7 monthsN.E. 2d 1159 (Ohio 1992)
15. Krejci v. Prud. Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 607 12 monthsN.E. 2d 446 (Ohio 1993)
16. Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E. 2d 140 13 months(Ohio 1993)
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E. 13 months2d 1037 (Ohio 1993)
18. Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E. 2d 202 (Ohio 10 /2 months1993)
Columbia Gas & Transmiss'n Corp. v. An 9 months
19. Exclusive Natural Gas, 620 N.E. 2d 48 (Ohio
1993)
Garlikov v. Contl. Cas. Co., 623 N.E. 2d 1183 12 months
(Ohio 1993)
21. Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E. 8 months2d 563 (Ohio 1993)
22. F & G Ins. Underwriters, Ins. v. Strayhom 2 monthsLimo. Serv., 613 N.E. 2d 235 (Ohio 1993)
2003]
Journal of Legislation
Case name Time Elapsed:
Certification to
Resolution
Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Crosby 11 months
23. Valve & Gage Co., docket 94-2410 (Ohio Dec.
20, 1994)
Henderson v. Lincoln Nat'l Specialty Ins. Co., 9 % months
626 N.E. 2d 657 (Ohio 1994)
Clark v. Quality Stores, Inc., 633 N.E. 2d 504 11 '/2 months
(Ohio 1994)
Corwin v. Ford Motor Co., 633 N.E. 2d 542 3 months
(Ohio 1994)
27. Colaluco v. Climaco, 648 N.E. 2d 1341 (Ohio 10 4 months1995)
Sun Refining Co. v. Crosby Valve & Gage 1 % months
Co., 627 N.E. 2d 552 (Ohio 1994)
Roth v. Capital Amer. Life Ins. Co., 626 8 '2 months
N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1994)
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cutcher, 654 N.E. 2d 980 7 Y2 months
- (Ohio 1995)
Colman v. Sandoz Pharm., 660 N.E. 2d 424 9 months(Ohio 1996)
32. Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 12 '/4 months1996)
MetroHealth v. Hoffman - La Roche, 670 14 / monthsN.E. 2d 1000 (Ohio 1997)
Fabens v. USAir, 670 N.E. 2d 1000 (Ohio 1 months1996)
35. Yepko v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 683 N.E. 2d 10 months1090 (Ohio 1997)
Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E. 2d 187 12 months3 (Ohio 1998)
Genaro v. Central Trans., 703 N.E. 2d 782 16 /2 months
_ (Ohio 1999)
38. Cheek v. Industrial Powder Coatings, 706 18 monthsN.E. 2d 323 (Ohio 1999)
Poe v. Trumbull Cty., 694 N.E. 2d 1324 (Ohio 8 Y2 months1998)
Mullins v. Rio Algom, Inc., 742 N.E. 2d 127 17 4 months(Ohio 1999)
Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 700 N.E. 2d 11 months1247 (Ohio 1998)
Delli Bovi v. Pacific Indemnity, 708 N.E. 2d 4 months693 (Ohio 1999)
Rice v. Certain Teed Corp., 704 N.E. 2d 1217 14 months(Ohio 1999)
44. Buckeye Union Ins. v. N.E. Ins., 720 N.E. 2d 18 months495 (Ohio 1999)
45. Laidlaw Waste Sys. v. Consolid. Rail Corp., 10 months
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Case name Time Elapsed:
Certification to
Resolution
709 N.E. 2d 124 (Ohio 1999)
Linko v. Indemnity Ins. 739 N.E. 2d 338 12 months
(Ohio 2000)
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage, 748 N.E. 2d 1111 17 months
(Ohio 2001)
Funk v. Rent All Mart, 742 N.E. 2d 127 (Ohio 9 3/4 months
2001)
Rolf v. Tri State Motor Transit, 745 N.E. 2d 6 months
380 (Ohio 2001)
Platte v. Ford Motor Co., 738 N.E. 2d 379 2 months
(Ohio 2000)
Schaffer v. State Farm Mut., 748 N.E. 2d 545 1 months
51. (Ohio 2001)
Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 756 2 /2 months
52. N.E. 2d 110 (Ohio 2001)
Hunter v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 759 1 1/4 months
53. N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 2001)
Kemper v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 758 Pending
54. N.E. 2d 184 (Ohio 2001)
Watkins v. Transcont'l Ins. Co., 759 N.E. 2d 1 months
55. 784 (Ohio 2001)
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